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Suying Liu 
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Professor Guofu Zhou, Co-Chair 
 
In Chapter 1, we generalize the concept of "systematic risk" to a broad class of risk measures 
potentially accounting for high distribution moments, downside risk, rare disasters, as well as 
other risk attributes. We offer two different approaches. First is an equilibrium framework 
generalizing the Capital Asset Pricing Model, two-fund separation, and the security market line. 
Second is an axiomatic approach resulting in a systematic risk measure as the unique solution to 
a risk allocation problem. Both approaches lead to similar results extending the traditional beta to 
capture multiple dimensions of risk. The results lend themselves naturally to empirical 
investigation. 
For Chapter 2, note that substantial cross-sectional variation in entrepreneurial compensation has 
been documented in prior literature, although explanation is scarce. The uniqueness of small 
businesses, in particular the intrinsic difference between entrepreneurs and corporate managers, 
calls for additional insights aside from that on executive compensation. This study takes an 
asymmetric-information perspective, where a continuous-time game-theoretic model is 
developed, incorporating an interesting trade-off between current and future payoffs. A 
breakdown in the market of entrepreneurial ventures will not occur, but both separating and 
pooling equilibria are possible, and consequently an equilibrium is not necessarily 
informationally consistent. Furthermore, when an equilibrium is indeed revealing, the 
dissipativeness of the signal emitted by entrepreneurs is completely endogenous. These findings 
 ix 
 
correspond naturally to empirical predictions about entrepreneurial pay, especially on the cross-
industry differential in compensation structure.    
In terms of Chapter 3, notice that life insurance often embeds a surrender option that gives the 
policy holder a right to exchange an existing contract for its cash surrender value. Similar to 
mortgage prepayment option that imposes a cash-flow risk to MBS investors, this surrender 
option is a source of concern for life insurers. While prior studies have attempted to quantify this 
surrender risk by pricing the surrender option, a common theoretical assumption imposed is fully 
rational response of policy holders to only interest rates. However, actual surrender experience 
indicates that interest rates are just one of the multiple factors that drive the surrender decision 
and policy holder response is not necessarily optimal. This research therefore integrates an 
empirical surrender function into the option pricing framework by employing a novel data set 
from a large life insurance industry experience study. It shows, for the first time in the literature, 
that policy vintages are a particularly significant and meaningful factor in addition to 
macroeconomic variables that impact surrender activity. Using these empirics, I find that the 
experience-based value of the surrender option is substantially less than its fully rational 
counterpart. In addition, the competitive landscape of the life insurance industry and the interest 
rate environment both play an important role in assessing the surrender risk exposure of life 
insurers.
1 Generalized Systematic Risk
1.1 Introduction
Risk is a complex concept. The denition of risk and its implications have long been
the subject of both academic and practical debate. This issue has gained even more
prominence during the recent nancial crisis, when markets and individual assets
were hit by catastrophic events whose ex-ante probabilities were considered negligible.
Indeed, these events demonstrate that riskaccounts for much more than what is
measured by the variance of the returns of an asset. High distribution moments, rare
disasters, and downside risk are just some of the di¤erent aspects that may be of
interest when measuring risk.
In this paper we allow risk to take a very general form. We then re-visit the
classic notion of systematic risk,which reects the contribution of an asset to the
risk of a portfolio. Traditional measures of systematic risk focus on a narrow set
of risk attributes. In particular, the most well-known and widely used measure of
systematic risk is the beta of the asset, which is the slope from regressing the asset
returns on portfolio returns (Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965a,b), and Mossin (1966)).
Beta is the contribution of an asset to the risk of the portfolio as measured by the
variance of its return. It sets the foundations for all risk-return analysis as part of
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). However, the traditional beta ignores all
aspects of risk other than the variance, such as high distribution moments and rare
disasters.
We o¤er two di¤erent approaches to generalizing systematic risk. First we study
an equilibrium framework modifying the traditional CAPM to allow for a broad set of
risk attributes. The equilibrium approach allows us to extend classic results such as
the geometry of e¢ cient portfolios, the two-fund separation theorem, the e¢ ciency of
the market portfolio, and the security market line. Second is an axiomatic approach
in which we recast the issue as a risk allocation problem. We then specify desirable
properties of systematic risk, leading to a unique solution. Both approaches yield
similar results, generalizing the traditional beta to reect a variety of risk attributes.
We begin with a broad denition of what would constitute a measure of risk. We
dene a risk measure as any mapping from random variables to real numbers. That
is, a risk measure is simply a summary statistic that encapsulates the randomness
using just one number. The variance (or standard deviation) is obviously the most
1
commonly used risk measure. However, many other risk measures have been proposed
and used. For example, high distribution moments can account for skewness and tail
risk, downside risk accounts for the variation in losses, and value at risk is a popular
measure of disaster risk. Recently, Aumann and Serrano (2008) and Foster and Hart
(2009) o¤ered two appealing risk measures that account for all distribution moments
and for disaster risk.1 All of these measures fall under our wide umbrella of risk
measures. Moreover, any linear combination of risk measures is itself a risk measure.
Thus, one can easily create measures of risk that account for a number of dimensions
of riskiness, assigning the required weight to each dimension.
Our rst analysis generalizes the classic CAPM to allow for a broad set of risk
measures. The idea is simple. In the classic CAPM setting investors are assumed to
have mean-variance preferences. That is, their utility is increasing in the expected
payo¤ and decreasing in the variance of their payo¤s. In our generalized setting we
assume that investors have mean-risk preferences, where the term riskstands for
a host of potential risk measures. We provide mild su¢ cient conditions under which
these preferences are locally consistent with expected utility in the sense of Machina
(1982).
We consider an exchange economy with a nite number of risky assets, one risk-
free asset, and a nite number of investors with mean-risk preferences. As usual, in
equilibrium each investor chooses a portfolio of assets from the set of e¢ cient port-
folios, minimizing risk for a given expected return. However, due to the generality of
the risk measure, the geometry of this set is more complicated than in the case where
risk is measured by the variance. Nevertheless, we establish su¢ cient conditions on
the risk measure under which the solution to each investors problem satises Tobins
(1958) two-fund separation property. That is, each investors optimal portfolio of
assets can be presented as a linear combination of the risk-free asset and a unique
portfolio of risky assets. We demonstrate that a variety of risk measures satisfy these
su¢ cient conditions, where the variance is just one special case. A consequence of
two-fund separation is that the equilibrium market portfolio lies on the e¢ cient fron-
tier. Using this we establish a generalization of the classic security market line (SML)
to a large class of risk measures. Specically, in equilibrium, the expected return of
1See Hart (2011) for a unied treatment of these two measures and Kadan and Liu (2014) for an
analysis of the moment properties of these measures.
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each risky asset i satises
E (~zi) = rf + BRi
 
E
 
~zM
  rf ;
where ~zi is the risky return of asset i; ~zM is the risky return of the market portfolio,
rf is the risk-free rate, and BRi is the systematic risk of asset i given the risk measure
R. Moreover, BRi is given in closed form as the marginal contribution of asset i to
the market risk scaled by the weighted average of such marginal contributions across
all assets in the economy.
In the special case in which R is the variance, BRi coincides with the traditional
beta. More generally, we show that our equilibrium setting is versatile enough to allow
for a variety of risk attributes such as tail risk, downside risk, and rare disasters,
among others. Our setting can also readily account for risk measures that reect
several of these risk attributes, assigning di¤erent weights to each of them. We
illustrate that in all these cases one can readily derive closed form solutions for the
generalized betas. Typically, these betas reect the covariation of the return of asset
i with some function of the market return. In general, these betas do not take the
form of a regression coe¢ cient. Nevertheless, they can be estimated directly from
return data and applied in a standard Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional analysis.
The CAPM equilibrium can be thought of as a special case of the more general
problem of risk allocation. Indeed, the CAPM beta measures the contribution of
one asset to the risk of the market portfolio. Many other problems of considerable
economic import require estimating the contribution of one asset to some specic
portfolio of assets (not necessarily the market portfolio). For example, the government
is constantly interested in the contribution of particular banks and other nancial
institutions to the total market risk (known as systemic risk). Banks and other
nancial institutions may also nd it useful to calculate the contribution of di¤erent
assets on their balance sheet to the total risk of the institution, so that each asset or
business unit could be taxedappropriately. All of these problems are essentially risk
allocation problems in which total risk should be allocated among the constituents
of a portfolio. We broaden the term systematic riskto designate solutions to such
problems. That is, a systematic risk measure is a vector specifying the portion of the
total portfolio risk allocated to each asset in the portfolio. The literature has not yet
presented a general solution to this problem for a broad set of risk measures and for
arbitrary portfolios.
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In the second part of this paper we tackle this problem from an axiomatic point of
view. We state desirable properties of systematic risk measures, which we call axioms,
and we look for solutions that satisfy these properties. Unlike in the equilibrium
setting, here we do not need to impose almost any structure on the risk measure.
Moreover, the portfolio of assets is arbitrary and is not limited to the market portfolio.
We state four economically plausible axioms that systematic risk measures are
expected to satisfy. We then show that these four axioms imply a unique systematic
risk measure which applies to all risk allocation problems. This measure is given by a
scaled version of the Aumann-Shapley (1974) diagonal formula, which was developed
as a solution concept in cooperative game theory. Essentially, this formula calculates
for each asset the average of its marginal contributions to portfolios along a diagonal
starting from the origin and ending at the portfolio of interest. In the common
case in which the risk measure is homogeneous of some degree, the solution becomes
very simple, and it coincides with the generalized beta obtained in the equilibrium
setting above. In particular, it assigns to each asset its marginal contribution to total
portfolio risk scaled by the weighted average of marginal contributions of all assets.
Our proof of the axiomatization result relies on a mapping between risk allocation
problems and cost allocation problems studied in Billera and Heath (1982).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the related literature. In
Section 1.3 we dene the notion of risk measures. Section 1.4 studies the equilibrium
setup and o¤ers a generalization of the CAPM. In Section 1.5 we present the axiomatic
approach. Section 1.6 concludes. Proofs of the main theorems are in Appendix I,
proofs of propositions and other derivations are in Appendix II, and other technical
results are provided in an Internet Appendix.
1.2 Related Literature
Our paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, the paper adds to
the growing literature on high distribution moments, disaster risk, and other risk
attributes, as well as their e¤ect on prices. Rubinstein (1973), Kraus and Litzen-
berger (1976), Jean (1971), Kane (1982), and Harvey and Siddique (2000) argue that
investors favor right-skewness of returns, and demonstrate the cross-sectional impli-
cations of this e¤ect. In addition, Barro (2006, 2009), Gabaix (2008, 2012), Gourio
(2012), Chen, Joslin, and Tran (2012), and Wachter (2013) study the aversion of
investors to tail risk and rare disasters. Ang, Chen, and Xing (2006) and Lettau,
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Maggiori, and Weber (2013) show that downside risk is a good explanatory variable
for returns in both equity and currency markets. Our paper adds to this literature
by outlining a general approach to measuring systematic risk that can capture the
contribution of an asset to a range of risk dimensions such as high distribution mo-
ments, downside risk, and rare disasters. Our framework is exible and can account
for either one risk aspect or a combination of several of them.
Our equilibrium approach follows a reduced form, where preferences are described
through the aversion to broadly dened risk. Our main results are derived without
the need to specify an exact form of the utility function. This is di¤erent from the
approach in consumption-based asset pricing models (e.g., Bansal and Yaron (2004)
and Campbell and Cochrane (1999)). These models rely on the specication of a
particular utility function (such as Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences or preferences
reecting past habits). One advantage of our approach is that it provides a parsi-
monious and simple one-factor model that can capture di¤erent aspects of risk in a
manner that may lend itself naturally to empirical investigation. Another feature of
our approach is that, unlike consumption-based models, it resorts to prices directly.
Thus, one can potentially test our model without relying on consumption data.
The paper also adds to the growing literature on risk measurement. This literature
dates back to Hadar and Russell (1969), Hanoch and Levy (1969), and Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1970) who extend the notion of riskiness beyond the varianceframe-
work by introducing stochastic dominance rules. Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath
(1999) specify desirable properties of coherent risk measures, and Rockafellar, Urya-
sev, and Zabarankin (2006a) introduce the notion of generalized deviation measures.
More recently, Aumann and Serrano (2008), Foster and Hart (2009, 2013), and Hart
(2011) have come up with appealing risk measures that generalize conventional sto-
chastic dominance rules. Notably, all the risk measures discussed in this literature
are idiosyncratic in nature. Our paper contributes to this literature by specifying a
method to calculate the systematic risk of an asset for any given risk measure. This
in turn allows us to study the fundamental risk-return trade-o¤ associated with a risk
measure.
Our paper also adds to the recent literature on systemic risk, which is the risk
that the entire economic system collapses. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) dene
the CoV aR measure as the di¤erence between the value at risk of the banking
system conditional on the distress of a particular bank and the value at risk of the
5
banking system given that the bank is solvent. Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and
Richardson (2010) propose the Systemic Expected Shortfall measure, which estimates
the exposure of a particular bank in terms of under-capitalization to a systemic crisis.
Huang, Zhou, and Zhu (2009) measure the systemic risk of a nancial institution by
the price of insurance against nancial distress. Our paper takes a general approach
to the problem of estimating the contribution of one asset to the risk of a portfolio of
assets. We provide an easy-to-calculate and intuitive measure that applies to a wide
variety of risk measures, as well as in an array of contexts.
Our paper also contributes to the literature studying conditions for two-fund sep-
aration. The idea of two-fund separation was introduced by Tobin (1958). Since
then the literature discussed di¤erent su¢ cient conditions in terms of either agents
utility (e.g., Cass and Stiglitz (1970) and Dybvig and Liu (2015)) or the distribution
of returns (e.g., Ross (1978)). Here we take a somewhat di¤erent approach, as we
specify su¢ cient conditions for two-fund separation in terms of properties of the risk
measure. This approach is similar to the one taken in Rockafellar, Uryasev, and
Zabarankin (2006b), who consider general deviation measures. Our restrictions on
risk measures are weaker than theirs as we do not require homogeneity. All of these
papers consider two-fund separation only and do not provide any generalization of
the notion of systematic risk, which is the focus of our paper.
Additionally, the paper adds to an extensive list of studies applying the Aumann-
Shapley solution concept in di¤erent contexts, e.g., Billera, Heath, and Raanan
(1978), Samet, Tauman, and Zang (1984), Powers (2007), and Billera, Heath, and
Verrecchia (1981). Tarashev, Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2010) use the Shapley value
(Shapley (1953), a discrete version of the Aumann-Shapley solution concept) to mea-
sure systemic risk. Our paper o¤ers theoretical foundations for their practical ap-
proach.
1.3 Risk Measures and Their Properties
Let (
;F ; P ) be a probability space, where 
 is the state space, F is the -algebra of
events, and P () is a probability measure. As usual, a random variable is a measurable
function from 
 to the reals. In the context of investments, we typically consider
random variables representing the payo¤s or the returns of nancial assets. Thus, we
often refer to random variables as investmentsor random returns.We generically
denote random variables by ~z; which is a shorthanded notation for ~z (!) ; 8! 2 
:We
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restrict attention to random variables for which all moments exist. We denote the
expected value of ~z by E (~z) and its kth central moment by mk (~z) = E (~z   E (~z))k,
where k  2:
A risk measure is simply a function that assigns to each random variable a single
number summarizing its riskiness. Formally,
Denition 1 A risk measure is a function mapping random variables to the reals.2
We generically denote risk measures by R () : The simplest and most commonly
used risk measure is the variance (R (~z) = m2 (~z)). However, many other risk mea-
sures have been proposed in the literature, capturing higher distribution moments
and other risk attributes. A risk measure R () is homogeneous of degree k; if for any
random return ~z and positive number  > 0;
R (~z) = kR (~z) :
A weaker requirement, which is su¢ cient for most of our results, is that the risk
ranking between two investments does not depend on scaling. We say that R () is
scaling independent if for all  > 0 and any two random returns ~z1 and ~z2; R (~z1) >
R (~z2) implies R (~z1) > R (~z2) :
The next property of risk measures which will become useful is convexity. For-
mally, we say that a risk measure R () is convex if for any two random returns ~z1
and ~z2; and for any  2 (0; 1) ; we have
R (~z1 + (1  ) ~z2)  R (~z1) + (1  )R (~z2) ;
with equality holding only when ~z1 = ~z2 with probability 1. Notice that ~z1 +
(1  ) ~z2 can be considered as the return of a portfolio that assigns weights  and
1    to ~z1 and ~z2, respectively. Then the convexity condition says that the risk of
the portfolio should not be higher than the corresponding weighted average risk of
the constituent investments. Thus, convexity of a risk measure captures the idea that
diversifying among two investments lowers the total risk.
Next we would like to formalize a property dealing with the type of assets that are
risk-free. We say that a risk measure R () has the risk-free property, if (i) R (~z)  0
2Strictly speaking, a risk measure is also a function of the underlying probability measure P:
However, in our analysis we x P throughout, and yet consider di¤erent random variables. Thus,
it is convenient to think about risk measures as functions of the random variables, viewing the
probability measure as a xed parameter.
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for all ~z; (ii) R (~z) = 0 if and only if P (f~z = cg) = 1 for some constant c; and (iii)
R (~z1 + ~z2) = R (~z1) whenever R (~z2) = 0. Namely, R has the risk-free property if the
only assets with zero risk are those that pay a constant amount with probability 1,
if all other assets have strictly positive risk, and if adding a zero-risk asset does not
change risk. In what follows, we often refer to assets satisfying R (~z) = 0 as risk-free.
Risk measures can be applied to individual random variables or to portfolios of
random variables. Formally, assume there are n random variables represented by the
vector ez = (~z1; :::; ~zn) : A portfolio is a vector x = (x1; :::; xn) 2 Rn; where xi is the
dollar amount invested in ~zi:3 Then, x ez = Pni=1 xi~zi is itself a random variable. We
then say that the risk of portfolio x is simply R (x  ez) : When the vector of random
variables is unambiguous, we often abuse notation and denote R (x) as a shorthand
for R (x  ez). We say that a risk measure is smooth if for any vector of random
returns ez = (~z1; :::; ~zn) and for all portfolios x = (x1; :::; xn) we have that R (x  ez) is
continuously di¤erentiable in xi for i = 1; :::; n: We then write Ri (x) (or Ri (x  ez))
for the partial derivative of R () with respect to the amount invested in the ith asset
evaluated at x:4
When restricting attention to homogeneous risk measures, the properties discussed
above are maintained when taking convex combinations of di¤erent risk measures
with the same degree of homogeneity. Thus, we can easily create new risk measures
satisfying these properties from existing homogeneous risk measures. That is, let s
be a positive integer, let R1 () ; :::; Rs () be risk measures, and choose  = (1; :::; s)
with j > 0 8j. We can then dene a new risk measure by
R (~z) =
sX
j=1
jR
j (~z) ;
where j reects the weight assigned to the risk attribute measured by Rj. We then
have the following trivial but useful lemma.
Lemma 1 Assume that each Rj is homogeneous of degree k; convex, smooth, and
satises the risk-free property. Then, R also satises all of these properties.
3Throughout the paper we denote vectors using bold notation (for both numbers and random
variables).
4Note that we use subscripts to denote both elements of a vector and partial derivatives. For
example, xi is the ith element of the vector x while Ri () is the partial derivative of R () considered
as a function of portfolio amounts. This notation does not result in any ambiguity since the only
case in which the subscript should be interpreted as a partial derivative is when applied to the risk
measure considered as a function of portfolio amounts.
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1.3.1 Examples of Risk Measures
Below we present some popular examples of risk measures and discuss their properties.
Each of these examples highlights a di¤erent aspect of risk that may be of interest in
applications. These examples will be crucial later in the paper when we demonstrate
how to apply our main results.
Example 1 Even central moments and normalized even central moments.
For any integer k  2 even, the central moment R (~z) = mk (~z) is a risk measure
which is homogeneous of degree k, convex, smooth and satises the risk-free property.
The normalized central moment wk (~z) = (mk (~z))
1
k is also a risk measure. For exam-
ple, when k = 2; wk (~z) is the standard deviation of ~z: Normalized central moments
satisfy all of the above properties as well (with homogeneity of degree 1). Indeed, ho-
mogeneity, smoothness, and the risk-free property are trivial in these cases. Convexity
stems from the following result, which shows that wk (~z) is convex, and thus mk (~z) is
a fortiori convex.
Proposition 1 For all k  2 even, R (~z) = wk (~z) is a convex risk measure.
Example 2 Odd central moments and normalized odd central moments.
For any integer k  3 odd, the central moment R (~z) = mk (~z) is a risk measure which
is homogeneous of degree k and smooth. Similarly, the normalized odd moments wk (~z)
are homogeneous of degree 1 and smooth. In contrast to the even central moments,
neither convexity nor the risk-free property holds in this case.5
Evidently, the feature of odd central moments that prevents them from satisfying
convexity and the risk-free property is that they admit negative values. A natural
way to x this is to focus on just one side of the distribution. The next example
follows this idea, allowing one to readily incorporate aspects of odd central moments
(such as skewness) into risk measures that also satisfy convexity and the risk-free
property.
5To see the former, consider the simple example of two random returns, ~z1 and ~z2; which are
independent and have negative third central moments m3 (). Then, by independence and the
homogeneity of central moments,
m3

1
2
~z1 +
1
2
~z2

= (
1
2
)3m3(~z1) + (
1
2
)3m3(~z2) >
1
2
m3(~z1) +
1
2
m3(~z2);
since m3(~z1)+m3(~z2) < 0. To see the latter, note that the third moment can be negative, violating
the risk-free property.
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Example 3 Downside risk. When considering risk, investors sometimes restrict
attention to the lower outcomes of the distribution, in particular to those which fall
below the mean. Such an approach is called downside risk. Formally, for any integer
k  2; dene the downside risk of order k of ~z as
DRk (~z) = ( 1)k

E
 
[~z   E (~z)] k 1k ;
where [t]  = min (t; 0) for t 2 R: Often, this measure is used in the special case of k =
2. More generally, for any k  2; DRk (~z) is a risk measure which is homogeneous of
degree 1, smooth, and satises the risk-free property. The next proposition establishes
that this risk measure is also convex.
Proposition 2 For any k  2; DRk (~z) is a convex risk measure.
Example 4 Value at risk. A risk measure widely used in nancial risk manage-
ment is the Value at Risk (VaR), designed to capture the risk associated with rare
disasters. VaR measures the amount of loss not exceeded with a certain condence
level. Formally, given some condence level  2 (0; 1), for any random return ~z; the
VaR measure is dened as the negative of the -quantile of ~z; i.e.,
VaR(~z) =   inf fz 2 R : F (z)  g ; (1)
where F () is the cumulative distribution function of ~z: Notice that we include the mi-
nus sign to reect the fact that a larger loss indicates higher risk. If ~z is continuously
distributed with a density function f (), then (1) is implicitly determined byZ  VaR(~z)
 1
f (z) dz = : (2)
This risk measure is homogeneous of degree 1 and smooth.6 For any risk-free return
~z with P (f~z = cg) = 1; we have VaR(~z) =  c; implying that the VaR of risk-free
assets depends on the risk-free return. Hence, the risk-free property is not satised.
In addition, it is not hard to nd examples where convexity is violated for the VaR
measure.
6Formally, smoothness follows if a joint density of the random returns in a portfolio exists. This
is shown using an application of the implicit function theorem to (2). We omit the proof for brevity.
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Example 5 Expected shortfall and demeaned expected shortfall.7 These mea-
sures capture the average loss from disastrous events, dened as those involving a loss
larger than the VaR. Formally, assume that ~z can be represented by a density f ().
Given some condence level  2 (0; 1), for any random return ~z the Expected Shortfall
(ES) is the negative of the conditional expected value of ~z below the -quantile. That
is,
ES(~z) =  1

Z  VaR(~z)
 1
zf (z) dz: (3)
Additionally, when ~z = c (a constant) with probability 1 we set ES(~z) =  c: Similar
to VaR, ES is homogeneous of degree 1 and is smooth, but it does not satisfy the risk-
free property. To ensure that the risk-free property is satised it is useful to consider
the demeaned version of ES dened as
DES(~z) =  1

Z  VaR(~z)
 1
(z   E (~z)) f (z) dz = ES(~z) + E (~z) :
Similar to ES, DES also captures the expected loss from a rare disaster. This risk
measure is also homogeneous of degree 1, smooth, and it satises the risk-free prop-
erty.8 Moreover, unlike VaR, both ES and DES satisfy the convexity property as
shown in the next proposition.
Proposition 3 For any  2 (0; 1); R (~z) = ES(~z) and R (~z) = DES(~z) are convex.
Example 6 The Aumann-Serrano and Foster-Hart risk measures. Two
measures of riskiness have been proposed by Aumann and Serrano (2008, hereafter
AS) and Foster and Hart (2009, hereafter FH). These measures generalize the notion
of second-order stochastic dominance (SOSD). The AS measure RAS (~z) is given by
the unique positive solution to the implicit equation
E

exp

  ~z
RAS (~z)

= 1: (4)
The FH measure RFH (~z) is given by the unique positive solution to the implicit
equation
E

log

1 +
~z
RFH (~z)

= 0: (5)
7Expected shortfall is sometimes termed conditional VaR.
8The risk-free property follows since ES(~z) + E (~z)  0 for all signicance level 0 <  < 1 with
equality if and only if ~z is a constant with probability 1.
11
Both these measures are homogeneous of degree 1 and smooth. These two risk mea-
sures also satisfy the convexity property.9 By contrast, these two measures do not
satisfy the risk-free property.10
All of the risk measures discussed thus far are homogeneous of some degree. How-
ever, most of our results do not require homogeneity. The next set of examples
illustrates how non-homogeneous risk measures satisfying all of the other properties
can be constructed.
Example 7 Let R be a risk measure which is homogeneous of some degree k, convex,
and satises the risk-free property, and let h : [0;1)! R be a strictly increasing and
strictly convex function. Dene a new risk measure R^ by
R^ (~z) = h (R (~z))  h (0) :
It is straightforward to verify that R^ is scaling independent, convex, and satises the
risk-free property. However, R^ may fail to be homogeneous of any degree. For a
concrete example, set h (x) = ex, and let R = mk for k even. Then, R^ (~z) = eR(~z)  1
is not homogeneous of any degree and yet it satises all of the other properties.
1.4 Systematic Risk in an Equilibrium Setting
Traditionally, systematic risk is derived from the CAPM equilibrium setting. We will
now present a generalized version of this model. We rst outline the setup of the
model. We then study the geometry of solutions, and present a two-fund separation
result implying the e¢ ciency of the market portfolio. Finally, we derive a variant of
the security market line, enabling us to obtain a generalization of the traditional beta
as a measure of systematic risk.
1.4.1 Model Setup
Investors, Assets, and Timing. Assume a market with n + 1 assets f0; :::; ng :
Assets 1; :::; n are risky and pay a random amount denoted by (~y1; :::; ~yn) : Asset 0 is
9This follows since these risk measures are subadditive and homogeneous of degree 1.
10To see this, note that for any constant c > 0, ~z + c rst-order stochastically dominates ~z: Since
RAS is consistent with rst-order stochastic dominance, we have that RAS (~z + c) < RAS (~z) : A
similar argument applies to RFH : Also, technically, these two risk measures are not dened for
risk-free assets.
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risk-free, paying an amount ~y0 which is equal to some constant y0 6= 0 with probability
1. Denote ey = (~y0; :::; ~yn) : There are ` investors in the market, all of whom agree on
the parameters of the model. The choice set of each investor is Rn+1; where j 2 Rn+1
represents the number of shares investor j chooses in each asset i = 0; :::; n, i.e., j
is a bundle of assets. Negative numbers represent short sales, and we impose no
short-sale constraints. The initial endowment of investor j is a non-zero ej 2 Rn+1+ :
We assume that
P`
j=1 e
j
i > 0 for i = 1; :::; n. That is, risky assets are in positive net
supply. An allocation is an `-tuple A =  1; :::; ` consisting of a bundle j 2 Rn+1
for each investor. An allocation A is attainable if P`j=1 j = P`j=1 ej, that is, if it
clears the market. A price system is a vector p = (p0; :::; pn) specifying a price for
each asset. Similar to the standard CAPM setting, there are two dates. At Date 0,
investors trade with each other and prices are set. At Date 1, all random variables
are realized.
Risk and Preferences. The traditional approach features investors with mean-
variance preferences, i.e., they prefer higher mean and lower variance of investments.
Instead, we assume that investors have mean-risk preferences. Formally, x a risk
measure R () : The utility that investor j = 1; :::; ` assigns to a bundle  2 Rn+1 is
given by
U j () = V j (E (  ey) ; R (  ey)) ; (6)
where V j is continuous, strictly increasing in its rst argument (expected payo¤) and
strictly decreasing in its second argument (risk of payo¤), and quasi-concave.
Note that U j () cannot be in general supported as a von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility. Nevertheless, in the Internet Appendix we show that if V j is di¤erentiable
and if the risk measure is a di¤erentiable function of a nite number of moments, then
U j () is a local expected utility function in the sense of Machina (1982). Namely,
comparisons of close by investments are well approximated by expected utility.
These conditions apply to a wide range of risk measures representing high distribution
moments.
An implication of quasi-concavity of V j is that when plotted in the mean-risk
space, the upper contour of each indi¤erence curve is convex. Similar to the stan-
dard mean-variance case, we will assume that a risk-free asset cannot be created
synthetically from risky assets. That is, there is no redundant risky asset: for any
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 = (0; 1; :::; n) 2 Rn+1 we have R (  ey) 6= 0 unless (1; :::; n) = (0; :::; 0) :11
Equilibrium. An equilibrium is a pair (p;A) where p 6= 0 is a price system and A = 
1; :::; `

is an attainable allocation, such that for each j 2 f1; :::; `g ; p j = p ej;
and if  2 Rn+1 and U j () > U j  j then p   > p  ej. In words, an equilibrium
is a price system and an allocation that clear the market such that each investor
optimizes subject to her budget constraint. The next theorem species conditions
under which an equilibrium exists.
Theorem 1 Suppose that R () is convex, smooth, and satises the risk-free property.
Then, an equilibrium exists.
It is well known that the CAPM setting can yield negative or zero prices (see for
example Nielsen (1992)). The reason for this is that preferences are not necessarily
monotone in the number of shares. Specically, the expected payo¤ to an investors
bundle increases as she holds more shares of a (risky) asset, but so does the risk. It
may well be that at some point, the additional expected payo¤ gained from adding
more shares to the bundle is not su¢ cient to compensate for the increase in risk. If
the equilibrium happens to fall in such a region then the asset becomes undesirable,
rendering a negative price. For our following results we will need that prices are
positive for all assets. The literature has suggested several ways to guarantee such an
outcome. In the Internet Appendix we provide one su¢ cient condition which follows
Nielsen (1992). Other (and possibly weaker) su¢ cient conditions may be obtained,
but are beyond the scope of this paper.
From now on we will only consider equilibria with positive prices. Given positivity
of prices, naturally, each equilibrium induces a vector of random returns ~zi =
~yi
pi
; and
we can talk about the expected returns and the risk of the returns in equilibrium, as
in the usual CAPM setting. In particular, the equilibrium return from the risk-free
asset ~z0 is equal to some constant rf with probability 1. We now study these returns.
1.4.2 A Generalized CAPM
Geometry of E¢ cient Portfolios Let (p;A) be an equilibrium. The equilibrium
allocation
 
1; :::; `

naturally induces a portfolio for each investor j given by xj =
11In the standard mean-variance case this condition corresponds to the variance-covariance matrix
of risky assets being positive-denite.
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 
xj0; :::; x
j
n

; where xji = pi
j
i is the amount invested in asset i; and where the vector
of portfolio weights of investor j is denoted by j and given by ji =
xjiPn
h=0 x
j
h
: Let
j =
nX
i=0
jiE (~zi)
be the expected return obtained by investor j in equilibrium. The next theorem
shows that the standard procedure of minimizing risk for a given expected return
applies to the equilibrium setting. It relies on the scaling independence and convexity
of the risk measure.
Theorem 2 Suppose that R () is scaling independent and convex. Then, in an equi-
librium with positive prices, for all investors j 2 f1; :::; `g, j is the unique solution
to
min
2Rn+1
R (  ez) (7)
s:t:
nX
i=0
iE (~zi) = 
j:
nX
i=0
i = 1:
Given this, we can now discuss the geometry of portfolios in the -R plane where
the horizontal axis is the risk of the return of a portfolio (R) and the vertical axis is the
expected return (). The locus of portfolios minimizing risk for any given expected
return is the boundary of the portfolio opportunity set. This set is convex in the
-R plane whenever R () is a convex risk measure. This follows simply because the
expectation operator is linear, implying that the line connecting any two portfolios in
the -R plane lies to the right of the set of portfolios representing convex combinations
of these two portfolios. Figure 1 illustrates two curves. The blue curve depicts the
opportunity set of risky assets only. The red curve depicts portfolios minimizing
risk for a given expected return, corresponding to Program (7). Both of these are
dening convex sets. Unlike in the special case of the standard deviation, we do not,
in general, obtain a straight line connecting the risk-free asset and risky portfolios.
We say that a portfolio is e¢ cient if it solves Program (7) for some j 2 R: Thus,
the red curve in Figure 1 corresponds to the set of e¢ cient portfolios.
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Figure 1: Portfolio Opportunity Set and E¢ cient Frontier
Two-Fund Separation We say that two-fund separation holds if the equilibrium
optimal portfolios for all investors can be spanned by the risk-free asset and a unique
portfolio of risky assets. That is, there exists a unique portfolio with weights P
such that P0 = 0; and for all investors j 2 f1; :::; `g ; the solution to Problem (7) is
a linear combination of P and the risk-free asset.
Theorem 3 Consider an equilibrium with positive prices. Assume that R () is scal-
ing independent, convex, and satises the risk-free property. Then, two-fund separa-
tion holds.
The proof is very intuitive, and we show it here. Let 1 and 2 be solutions to
Problem (7) for investors j1 6= j2, respectively, and without loss of generality assume
j1 = 1 and j2 = 2: The case of interest is when both 1 and 2 have non-zero
weights in some risky assets.12 By the risk-free property and by the non-redundancy
assumption, R (j  ez) > 0 for j = 1; 2: Hence, j = E (j  ez) > rf for j = 1; 2; since
otherwise j would be mean-risk dominated by the risk-free asset, and thus would
not be optimal.
Now, consider all the linear combinations of these two portfolios with the risk-free
asset. Since R () is assumed convex, the resulting curves are concave in the -R
12If only one investor holds non-zero weights in risky assets then two-fund separation is trivial.
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plane as illustrated in Figure 2. Note that both 1 and 2 can be presented as a
linear combination of the risk-free asset and some portfolios P1 and P2 of risky
assets only (i.e., P10 = 
P2
0 = 0): To show two-fund separation we need to show that
P1 = P2 : Suppose this is not the case. Then let ^1 be a linear combination of P2
and the risk-free asset such that E
 
^1  ez = 1: Similarly, let ^2 be a portfolio of
P1 and the risk-free asset such that E
 
^2  ez = 2: By convexity of R (), 1 and
2 are the unique solutions to Program (7) for j = 1; 2. Hence,
R
 
^1  ez > R  1  ez and R  ^2  ez > R  2  ez : (8)
Thus, as illustrated in Figure 2, the two curves must cross at least once. We will now
show that such crossings are impossible. Indeed, by scaling independence (8) implies
that for any  > 0;
R(1  ez) < R(^1  ez);
which together with risk-free property implies
R(1  ez+ (1  ) rf ) < R(^1  ez+ (1  ) rf ):
This means that all linear combinations of 1 with the risk-free asset (with positive
) lie strictly to the left of all linear combinations of ^1 with the risk-free asset. In
particular, ^2 can be obtained as a linear combination of 1 with the risk-free asset
by setting
 =
2   rf
1   rf > 0;
where the inequality follows since j > rf for j = 1; 2: But, using this  we obtain
R(^2  ez) < R(2  ez);
contradicting (8). Thus, two-fund separation must hold.
A corollary is that the unique portfolioP is e¢ cient. Indeed, let P = E
 
P  ez :
Since in equilibrium all investors hold a linear combination of the risk-free asset and
P ; and since j = E (j  ez)  rf for all j with strict inequality for some j; we have
two cases:13 (i) all investors hold P with a non-negative weight, and P > rf ; or (ii)
all investors hold P with a non-positive weight, and P < rf : But, the second case
is impossible since then the market cannot clear for at least one risky asset, which is
held in positive weight in P : Thus, P > rf :
13If all investors choose the risk-free asset then the market for risky assets cannot clear.
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Figure 2: Graphical Illustration of the Proof of Theorem 3
Now, assume that 0 6= P solves Problem (7) for j = P : Then, R (0  ez) <
R
 
P  ez ; and so by the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 3, all linear
combinations of 0 with the risk-free asset would have strictly lower risk than the
corresponding linear combinations of P with the risk-free asset. This contradicts
that P and the risk-free asset span all optimal portfolios. We thus have:
Corollary 1 Under the conditions of Theorem 3, the portfolio P is e¢ cient. In
particular, it solves Problem (7) for some P > rf :
Let xMi =
P`
j=1 x
j
i be the total amount invested in asset i in equilibrium. We
call xM =
 
xM1 ; :::; x
M
n

the market portfolio (consisting of risky assets only). Let M
be the corresponding portfolio weights: By Theorem 3, in equilibrium, the market
portfolio is equal to P ; the unique portfolio of risky assets that together with the
risk-free asset spans all optimal portfolios.14 Moreover, by corollary 1, the market
portfolio is e¢ cient, and its expected return is strictly higher than rf :
Corollary 2 Under the conditions of Theorem 3, the market portfolio is e¢ cient. In
particular, it solves Problem (7) for some M > rf :
14Note that P is of dimension n+ 1; but its rst component is zero. By saying that P = M
we mean that the Pi = 
M
i for i = 1; :::; n:
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A Generalized Security Market Line In the traditional CAPM framework, the
security market line describes the equilibrium relation between the expected returns
of individual assets and the market expected return. Specically, the expected return
of any asset in excess of the risk-free rate is proportional to the excess market expected
return, with the coe¢ cient of proportionality being equal to the traditional beta. The
following theorem provides su¢ cient conditions under which a similar relation holds
for a broad set of risk measures.
Theorem 4 Consider an equilibrium with positive prices and let M be the market
portfolio. Assume that R () is scaling independent, convex, smooth, and satises the
risk-free property. Then, for each asset i = 1; :::; n;
E (~zi) = rf + BRi
 
E
 
M  ez  rf ; (9)
where
BRi =
Ri
 
M
Pn
h=1 
M
h Rh (
M)
: (10)
If R () is also homogeneous of some degree k, then (10) takes the form
BRi =
Ri
 
M

kR (M)
:
Thus, the security market line has the traditional form, with the generalized
systematic risk measure
 BRi  given as the marginal contribution of asset i to the total
risk of the market portfolio, scaled by the weighted average of marginal contributions
of all assets. If R is furthermore homogeneous, it is simply given by the marginal
contribution of asset i scaled by total risk multiplied by the degree of homogeneity.
To see the intuition for this result, start with an e¢ cient portfolio  and consider
borrowing one dollar at the risk-free rate and investing this dollar in asset i: The
e¤ect of this exercise on the risk of the portfolio is (up to rst order approximation)
Ri (
) R0 () ; which by the risk-free property is just Ri () : Since  is e¢ cient,
the e¤ect of this exercise on risk is equal to the shift in the expected return constraint
times the shadow price of the constraint, , i.e.,
Ri (
) =  (E (zi)  rf ) : (11)
Taking the weighted average using the portfolio weights gives
nX
i=1
iRi (
) =  (E (  ez)  rf ) : (12)
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Using (11) and (12) we obtain that for any e¢ cient portfolio ;
Ri (
)Pn
i=1 

iRi (
)
=
E (zi)  rf
E (  ez)  rf :
Namely, in equilibrium, BRi (as given in (10)) equals the ratio of the excess return of
any asset i to the excess return of the e¢ cient portfolio . Finally, since M has
been shown to be e¢ cient (Corollary 2) we obtain the result.
1.4.3 Applications and Empirical Implementation
We now provide several applications to illustrate the versatility and power of The-
orem 4 and its potential empirical usefulness. We show how to use this theorem to
generalize the traditional CAPM to account for high distribution moments, downside
risk, rare disasters, as well as combinations thereof. We also discuss the economic
interpretation of systematic risk in these cases and explain how these results can be
implemented empirically.
Applications
Application I: The standard CAPM.When the risk measure R is the variance,
i.e., R (~z) = Var (~z) ; Theorem 4 coincides with the standard CAPM (see Appendix
II for the derivation). Namely,
BRi =
Cov
 
~zi;
M  ez
Var (M  ez) : (13)
Thus, in this case systematic risk is measured as the standard regression coe¢ cient.
The same result is obtained when R (~z) = w2 (~z) ; i.e., the standard deviation of
returns.
Application II: A CAPM reecting aversion to tail risk. The simplest gen-
eralization of the standard CAPM is to the case in which investors are averse to any
moment of an even degree. That is, set R (~z) = mk (~z) = E (~z   E (~z))k ; k even. This
risk measure satises all of the conditions in Theorem 4 (see Example 1). In this case
the systematic risk takes the form (see Appendix II for the derivation)
BRi =
Cov

~zi;

M  ez M  E (ez)k 1
mk (M  ez) : (14)
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That is, the systematic risk of asset i is proportional to the covariance of ~zi with
the (k   1)th power of the demeaned market return. In the special case of k = 2
(variance), this reduces to (13) as expected. Another important special case is k = 4;
in which R (~z) measures the tail risk of ~z: Then,
BRi =
Cov

~zi;

M  ez M  E (ez)3
m4 (M  ez) :
Namely, the systematic risk of asset i is proportional to the co-kurtosis of ~zi with the
demeaned market return. Similarly, when R (~z) = wk (~z), the normalized kth central
moment, BRi again takes the form (14).
Application III: A CAPM reecting aversion to downside risk. AssumeR (~z) =
DRk (~z) for k  2: This risk measure satises all of the conditions in Theorem 4 (see
Example 3). The systematic risk is then given by (see Appendix II for the derivation)
BRi = ( 1)k
Cov

~zi;

M  ez  E  M  ez k 1
(DRk (M  ez))k : (15)
That is, the systematic risk of asset i is proportional to the covariance of ~zi with the
(k   1)th power of the demeaned market return, censored at zero.
Application IV: A CAPM reecting aversion to rare disasters. To account
for rare disasters we can use the demeaned expected shortfall measure, which satises
all the requirements in Theorem 4 (see Example 5). Assume then that R (~z) =
DES (~z) ; where 0 <  < 1 is some condence level. The systematic risk in this case
is given by (see Appendix II for the derivation)
BRi =  
E

~zi   E (~zi) jM  ez   VaR(M  ez)
DES(M  ez) : (16)
Thus, the systematic risk of asset i in this case equals (the negative of) the expected
demeaned return of asset i conditional on the market being in a disaster, scaled by
the markets demeaned expected shortfall. An equivalent expression is
BRi =  
Cov

~zi; 1M ez VaR(M ez)
 DES(M  ez) ;
showing that systematic risk in this case is proportional to the covariance of the asset
return with an indicator equal to one when the market is in a disaster.
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So far we have restricted our applications to cases in which investors are averse
to just one risk aspect. In reality, it is likely that investors are averse to several risk
attributes. Our framework allows for this by constructing risk measures that account
for several risk characteristics using Lemma 1. The next application illustrates this
point.
Application V: A CAPM reecting aversion to variance, downside skew-
ness, tail risk, and rare disasters. Consider the following family of risk measures
R (~z) = 1w2 (~z) + 2DR3 (~z) + 3w4 (~z) + 4DES (~z)
for some condence level : Here 1; :::; 4 are non-negative weights accounting for
the degree of aversion to variance, downside skewness, tail risk, and rare disasters,
respectively.15 The case 1 = 1 and 2 = 3 = 4 = 0 corresponds to the traditional
CAPM, whereas di¤erent values of the weights allow us to reect di¤erent levels of
aversion to the di¤erent risk attributes.
By Lemma 1 these risk measures satisfy all the conditions in Theorem 4 and so
all the CAPM results above hold. The resulting systematic risk measure accounts for
the contribution of asset i to all four risk attributes. It is simply given by a weighted
average of the systematic risk measures as calculated in the above applications (see
Appendix II). Namely,
BRi =
R1
 
M

R (M)
BR1i +
R2
 
M

R (M)
BR2i +
R3
 
M

R (M)
BR3i +
R4
 
M

R (M)
BR4i ; (17)
whereR1 () = 1w2 () ; R2 () = 2DR3 (), R3 () = 3w4 () ; andR4 () = 4DES () ;
and where BR1i ; BR2i ; BR3i ; and BR4i are given by (13)(16).
Empirical Implementation
Similar to the classic CAPM, Theorem 4 and its applications lend themselves nat-
urally to empirical investigation. The standard approach for testing and applying the
CAPM follows Fama and MacBeth (1973) and Fama and French (1992). The rst
stage in their approach consists of estimating beta through time-series regressions,
whereas the second stage consists of cross-sectional regressions of excess asset returns
on estimated betas.
15Note that we are using here w2 () and w4 () (the normalized second and fourth moments)
instead of m2 () and m4 () : This is done to make sure that all of the components in R () are
homogeneous of degree 1, and so R () is homogeneous.
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To apply this approach in our case, one needs to rst take a stand on what the
risk measure R is. Then, using Theorem 4 one can estimate BRi from time-series data.
For example, if R takes the form as in Application V above, then we need time series
return data for asset i and for the market portfolio in order to estimate BRi from
(17). This will be a weighted average of the betas prescribed in Applications IIV.
Note that unlike in the classic CAPM, BRi is in general not a regression coe¢ cient.
Nevertheless, it often takes the form of some scaled covariance of the asset returns
and some function of the market returns (see Applications IIV). Thus, BRi can still
be readily estimated from time-series return data. The cross-sectional part is then
identical in nature to that in Fama and MacBeth (1973).
It is important to note that the model does not provide us with guidance as to
what R is. Rather, for any given risk measure the model provides an expression for
the associated systematic risk. In practice we believe that the data can guide us in
nding what the truerisk is, to which investors are averse. For example, consider
Application V, which allows the risk measure to reect aversion to variance, downside
skewness, tail risk, and disaster risk. One still has a lot of exibility in choosing the
weights 1; :::; 4; which determine the degree of aversion to each particular aspect of
risk. The model can then allow the data to determine which set of weights obtains
the most support. This exibility is tantamount to the freedom provided by the
Arbitrage Pricing Theory (Ross (1976)) in which the model suggests the existence of
multiple systematic factors but does not provide guidance as to what these factors
are.
1.4.4 Further Discussion
Note that Theorem 4 relies on the market portfolio being e¢ cient, and that two-
fund separation is a way to achieve this e¢ ciency result. Our assumptions on the
risk measure are su¢ cient for two-fund separation, but they are by no means neces-
sary. Weaker conditions that guarantee two-fund separation may exist. Further, even
when two-fund separation fails, it does not necessarily mean that market e¢ ciency
is rejected. The literature explores market e¢ ciency from both theoretical (see, for
example, Dybvig and Ross (1982)) and empirical (see, for example, Levy and Roll
(2010)) views. Our generalized SML remains valid as long as we have evidence that
the market portfolio is mean-risk e¢ cient.
We should also mention that the classical notion of beta and its relation to ex-
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pected returns go beyond the standard CAPM setup. Specically, as long as there is
no arbitrage and so a stochastic discount factor exists, a beta representation of the
form
E (~zi) =  + Bi
exists (see Hansen and Richard (1987) and Cochrane (2001) Ch. 6). This does not
stand in conict to the results in this section. Rather, our results essentially identify a
class of stochastic discount factors driven by the mean-risk preferences being assumed.
1.5 Systematic Risk as a Solution to a Risk Allocation Prob-
lem
The equilibrium approach presented in the previous section generalizes the classic
CAPM, but it has two limitations. First, this approach allows us to calculate the
contribution of an asset to the risk of the market portfolio, but not to arbitrary port-
folios of risky assets. Second, to obtain the equilibrium results we imposed restrictions
on the risk measures (scaling independence, convexity, and the risk-free property).
These restrictions allow us to establish existence of equilibrium and e¢ ciency of the
market portfolio. However, some risk measures do not satisfy these conditions.
In this section we o¤er an alternative approach to developing a systematic risk
measure. This approach applies to any portfolio of risky assets and to a broader
class of risk measures. For example, if a bank would like to use the VaR measure to
estimate the contributions of di¤erent assets on its balance sheet to the total VaR of
the bank, then the results in this section can be applied. Importantly, when the risk
measure is homogeneous, the two approaches lead to an identical result, generalizing
the traditional beta.
Our approach is to consider this issue as a risk allocation problem, where the total
risk of a given portfolio needs to be fairly allocated among its components. We
o¤er four axioms that describe reasonable properties of solutions to risk allocation
problems. We then show that these axioms determine a unique formula for the
systematic risk of an asset, the contribution of the asset to the risk of the portfolio.
1.5.1 Axiomatic Characterization of Systematic Risk
A risk allocation problem of order n  1 is a pair (R;x) ; where R is a risk measure
and x 2 Rn++ is a portfolio specifying the dollar amount invested in each of n assets
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ez = (~z1; :::; ~zn) ; and R (x  ez) 6= 0. Denote the total dollar amount invested by
x =
Pn
i=1 xi. Also, let  be the vector of corresponding portfolio weights, i.e.,
i = xi=x. The only two requirements we impose on R in this section are that
R (0) = 0 (i.e., zero investment entails no risk) and that R () is smooth.
A systematic risk measure is a function mapping any risk allocation problem of
order n to a vector BR (x) =
 BR1 (x) ; :::;BRn (x) in Rn: Intuitively, one can think of
BRi (x) as the contribution of asset i to the total risk of portfolio x; which is R (x  ez) :
Note that a systematic risk measure applies to all possible pairs of risk measures and
portfolios, rather than to a given pair.
We now state four axioms specifying desirable economic properties of systematic
risk measures. The intuition for why these axioms make sense mostly comes from the
traditional beta. Here we simply try to identify properties of beta and ask how these
properties could be generalized to arbitrary risk measures. It is important to empha-
size that these axioms do not impose any restriction on the risk measure. Rather, they
impose structure on what would constitute a solution to the risk allocation problem.
The rst axiom postulates that (as in the traditional beta) the weighted average
of systematic risk values across all assets is normalized to 1. Assets that contribute
strongly to the risk of the portfolio (aggressive assets) have a beta greater than 1,
whereas assets that have little contribution to total risk (defensive assets) have a beta
less than 1. The weighted average of all asset betas is 1. We ask that a generalized
systematic risk measure have the same property.
Axiom 1 Normalization:
Pn
i=1 iBRi (x) = 1:
The sum of any two risk measures is itself a risk measure. The next axiom requires
that in such a case the systematic risk measure of the sum will be a risk-weighted
average of systematic risk based on each of the two risk components.
Axiom 2 Linearity: If R () = R1 () +R2 () ; then
BRi (x) =
R1 (x)
R (x)
BR1i (x) +
R2 (x)
R (x)
BR2i (x) for all i = 1; :::; n:
When risk is measured using variance, the notion of systematic risk is closely
tied to the concepts of correlation and covariance. It is not easy to generalize these
concepts to arbitrary risk measures. However, two features can be easily generalized
laying the foundations for the next two axioms.
25
First, while the concept of correlation is not easy to generalize, the idea of
perfect correlationdoes lend itself to a natural generalization. The intuition is that
if several assets are perfectly correlated, then essentially they can be thought of as
the same asset. Thus, a portfolio of perfectly correlated assets can be viewed as one
bigasset. This intuition comes from the standard notion of correlation relating to
risk being measured by the variance, but it can easily be generalized to arbitrary risk
measures.
Formally, given a risk measure R; we say that assets ez = (~z1; :::; ~zn) are R-
perfectly correlated if there exists a function g () : R 7! R and a non-zero vector
q = (q1; :::; qn) 2 Rn+, such that for any portfolio  = (1; :::; n) 2 Rn+ we have
R (  ez) = g(  q): That is, the n assets are R-perfectly correlated if the risk of any
portfolio of these assets as measured by R only depends on some linear combination of
their investment amounts. In essence, this means that the n assets can be aggregated
into one bigasset by assigning each asset a certain weight specied by the vector
q:16 Note that di¤erent risk measures correspond to di¤erent concepts of R-perfect
correlation, which typically would not coincide with the standard notion of perfect
correlation associated with the variance.17
The next axiom imposes that if the n assets are R-perfectly correlated, then their
systematic risk measures are proportional to each other.
Axiom 3 Proportionality: If ez = (~z1; :::; ~zn) are R-perfectly correlated with weights
q = (q1; :::; qn), then
qjBRi (x) = qiBRj (x) for all i; j = 1; :::; n: (18)
Next we turn to generalize the idea of positive correlation.Assume rst that
risk is measured using variance. Then, if two assets are positively correlated, adding
16To see the correspondence to the standard notion of perfect correlation, consider the following
example. Assume risk is measured using variance and let ez = (~z1; ~z2; ~z3) with ~z2 = 2~z1 and ~z3 = 5~z1.
Then, all three assets are perfectly correlated and for any portfolio (1; 2; 3) we have
V ar (1~z1 + 2~z2 + 3~z3) = (1 + 22 + 53)
2
V ar (~z1) :
Thus, we can set g (t) = t2 and the vector of weights is q =
p
V ar (ez1) (1; 2; 5) : More generally,
it is easy to verify that when risk is measured using variance, the concept of R-perfect correlation
coincides with the standard denition of perfect correlation.
17In the standard notion of perfect correlation, we di¤erentiate between positive and negative
perfect correlation. We could do the same here by allowing elements of q to take negative values.
However, this is not needed for our axiomatic characterization.
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additional units of an asset to any portfolio of the two always increases total variance.
We can then rely on this feature to get a generalized notion of positive correlation.
Specically, given a risk measure R; we say that assets ez = (~z1; :::; ~zn) are R-positively
correlated if Ri (  ez)  0 for all  2 Rn+ and for all i = 1; :::; n. Namely, the assets
are R-positively correlated if adding one more unit of an asset to any portfolio with
non-negative weights can never reduce total risk. The key to this denition is that
for the assets to be R-perfectly correlated it is not enough that adding one more unit
of an asset would increase risk for a particular portfolio. Rather, this property has to
hold for all possible portfolios of these assets.18 The next axiom requires that when
the assets are R-positively correlated, the systematic risk of all assets is non-negative.
Axiom 4 Monotonicity: If ez = (~z1; :::; ~zn) are R-positively correlated, then BRi (x) 
0 for all i = 1; :::; n:
Our main result in this section follows. It states that Axioms 14 are su¢ cient to
pin down a unique systematic risk measure, which takes on a very simple and intuitive
form. Moreover, when the risk measure is homogeneous the solution coincides with
the equilibrium result in Theorem 4.
Theorem 5 There exists a unique systematic risk measure satisfying Axioms 14.
For each risk allocation problem (R;x) of order n; it is given by
BRi (x) =
x
R 1
0
Ri (tx1; :::; txn) dt
R (x1; :::; xn)
for i = 1; :::; n: (19)
Furthermore, if R is homogeneous of some degree k; then (19) reduces to
BRi (x) =
Ri ()Pn
h=1 hRh ()
(20)
=
Ri ()
kR ()
: (21)
Thus, when R is homogeneous (which is a common case), the systematic risk of
asset i is measured simply as the marginal contribution of asset i to the total risk of the
portfolio, scaled by the weighted average of marginal contributions of all assets. This
is identical to the result in Theorem 4 only with respect to an arbitrary portfolio rather
18It is easy to check that when risk is measured using variance, the assets are R-positively corre-
lated if and only if the correlation between any two assets is non-negative.
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than the market portfolio. When the risk measure is not homogeneous, the expression
in (19) shows that systematic risk depends not only on marginal contributions at x;
but rather on marginal contributions along a diagonal between (0; :::; 0) and x: This
is a variation of the diagonal formula of Aumann and Shapley (1974). The integral
can be interpreted as an average of marginal contributions of asset i to the risk of
portfolios along the diagonal. Then, BRi (x) is simply a scaled version of the integral
where the scaling ensures that Axiom 1 is satised.
Note that when the risk measure is homogeneous, BRi (x) depends only on the
portfolio weights  (and not on the dollar amounts invested in each asset). Indeed, in
the homogeneous case Ri (tx1; :::; txn) is proportional to Ri (x1; :::; xn) for all t 2 [0; 1] ;
yielding the simple expression in (20). When the risk measure is not homogeneous,
the actual investment amounts (not just the weights) are necessary for the calculation
of systematic risk.
The uniqueness part of the proof of Theorem 5 is in Appendix I. It relies on the
solutions to cost allocation problems established in Billera and Heath (1982).19 In
this proof we draw a one-to-one mapping between risk allocation problems and cost
allocation problems, and from systematic risk measures to solutions of cost allocation
problems. Then, we show that given these mappings, our set of axioms is stronger
than the set of conditions specied in Billera and Heath (1982). This in turn allows
us to apply their result to obtain uniqueness.
Existence is straightforward and we show it below by demonstrating that (19)
satises Axioms 14. Suppose that BRi (x) is given by (19). Then,
nX
i=1
iBRi (x) =
nX
i=1
xi
x
x
R 1
0
Ri (tx1; :::; txn) dt
R (x1; :::; xn)
=
R 1
0
Pn
i=1 xiRi (tx1; :::; txn) dt
R (x1; :::; xn)
=
R 1
0
dR(tx1;:::;xn)
dt
dt
R (x1; :::; xn)
= 1; (since R (0) = 0)
19Billera and Heath (1982) dene a cost allocation problem of order n as a pair (h;x) where
h : Rn+ ! R is continuously di¤erentiable and h (0) = 0: They interpret x as a vector of inputs and
h as a cost function. The question they ask is how to allocate total cost among the di¤erent inputs.
See Appendix I for more details on their model.
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and so Axiom 1 holds. To see Axiom 2, suppose R () = R1 () +R2 () : Then,
BRi (x) =
x
R 1
0
Ri (tx1; :::; txn) dt
R (x1; :::; xn)
=
x
R 1
0 R
1
i (tx1;:::;txn)dt
R1(x1;:::;xn)
R1 (x1; :::; xn) +
x
R 1
0 R
2
i (tx1;:::;txn)dt
R2(x1;:::;xn)
R2 (x1; :::; xn)
R (x1; :::; xn)
;
as required. Next, for Axiom 3, suppose that ez = (~z1; :::; ~zn) are R-perfectly corre-
lated. Then, there exists g () : R 7! R and a nonzero vector q 2 Rn+ such that for all
 = (1; :::; n) we have R () = g(  q). It follows that
Ri () = qig
0(  q) for all i = 1; :::; n:
Hence, for all i = 1; :::; n;
BRi (x) =
xqi
R 1
0
g0 (tx  q) dt
R (x1; :::; xn)
;
which implies (18). Finally, given the denition of R-positive correlation, it is imme-
diate that (19) satises Axiom 4.
1.5.2 Applying the Result
In Section 1.4.3 we have provided several applications and shown how to calculate
systematic risk for di¤erent risk measures. All of these results apply to the approach
presented in this section as well, but now they can be used with respect to arbitrary
portfolios rather than just the market portfolio. The next example illustrates a case of
risk measures that do not satisfy the conditions in Section 1.4, but for which Theorem
5 applies.
Recall the Aumann-Serrano and Foster-Hart risk measures in Example 6. These
measures are homogeneous, convex, and smooth, but they do not satisfy the risk-free
property.20 Still, Theorem 5 allows us to calculate the systematic risk associated with
these risk measures.
20Although RAS (0) and RFH (0) are not dened, they can be approximated using a limiting
argument. Specically, take any random return ~z satisfying E (~z) > 0 and P (f~z < 0g) > 0: Then,
for both R () = RAS () and R () = RFH () ; we can dene R (0) by
R (0)  lim
t!0
R (t~z) = 0;
where the equality follows since both the AS and the FH measures are homogeneous of degree 1.
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Using Theorem 5 and applying the implicit function theorem to (4) and (5) yields
the systematic risk of individual assets associated with the AS and FH measures
relative to any portfolio weights  as follows:
BRASi () =
E
h
exp

  ez
R()

~zi
i
E
h
exp

  ez
R()

  ezi ;
and
BRFHi () =
E
h
~zi
R()+ez
i
E
h
ez
R()+ez
i :
1.5.3 Discussion
When the risk measure is homogeneous both the equilibrium approach and the ax-
iomatic approach yield the same result:
BRi () =
Ri ()Pn
h=1 hRh ()
: (22)
It is interesting to ask what would happen if we used (22) to dene systematic risk
when R is not homogeneous (instead of using (19)). In particular, this alternative
measure only relies on the marginal contribution of asset i at  and not along the
diagonal. In the absence of homogeneity these two alternative denitions yield dif-
ferent results. Thus, given Theorem 5, it must be that (22) violates at least one of
our axioms. It is straightforward to check that the axiom being violated in this case
is Axiom 2 while the other three axioms are satised. We are not able to provide an
axiomatization that leads to (22) as a solution when the risk measure is not homoge-
neous. Notably, however, many commonly used risk measures are homogeneous, and
thus the two approaches often coincide.
Another approach to measuring systematic risk might be to dene
BRi () =
Ri ()
R ()
;
namely, the systematic risk of an asset is the marginal contribution of the asset to
total risk, scaled by total risk. This measure satises Axioms 2, 3, and 4 but it fails
Axiom 1, so it cannot be considered as a generalization of the traditional beta.
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Finally, it is worth noting that (22) can also be written as
BRi () =
d
dt

t=0
R (+t"i)
d
dt

t=0
R (+t)
;
where "i is an n-dimensional vector equal to 1 at the ith dimension and zero elsewhere.
Namely, when the risk measure is homogeneous, systematic risk of asset i can be
thought of as the directional derivative of total risk along the ith dimension scaled by
the derivative along the diagonal in the direction of the portfolio itself.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper we generalize the concept of systematic risk to account for a variety of
risk characteristics. Our equilibrium approach shows that results attributed to the
classic CAPM hold much more broadly. In particular, aspects of the geometry of
e¢ cient portfolios, two-fund separation, and the security market line are derived in
a setting where risk can account for a variety of attributes. Our axiomatic approach
species four economically meaningful conditions that pin down a unique measure
of systematic risk. Both approaches lead to similar generalizations of the traditional
beta.
When risk is conned to measure the variance of a distribution, our systematic risk
measure coincides with the traditional beta, the slope from regressing asset returns
on portfolio returns. More generally, systematic risk is not a regression coe¢ cient.
Our equilibrium setting leads to the conclusion that systematic risk is simply the
marginal contribution of the asset to the risk of the portfolio of interest, scaled by the
weighted average of all such marginal contributions. An identical result is obtained
in the axiomatic approach for homogeneous risk measures. When the risk measure is
not homogeneous, the axiomatic approach gives rise to an expression for systematic
risk that involves averaging marginal contributions of the asset along a diagonal from
the origin to the portfolio of interest.
Our axiomatic approach applies to a wide variety of risk measures, requiring of
them only smoothness and zero risk for zero investment. The equilibrium framework
imposes additional conditions in the form of scaling independence, convexity, and the
risk-free property. Nevertheless, even in the equilibrium framework we are still left
with an extensive class of risk measures. Indeed, this class is su¢ ciently broad to
potentially account for high distribution moments, downside risk, rare disasters, and
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other aspects of risk. A limitation of our framework is that we restrict all investors
to use the same risk measure. Future research may direct at developing weaker
conditions on the risk measures and introducing more heterogeneity to investor risk
preferences.
Finally, our approach is agnostic regarding the choice of a particular risk mea-
sure. Indeed, which risk measures better capture the risk preferences of investors is
ultimately an empirical question. Our framework therefore provides foundations for
testing the appropriateness of risk measures and consequently selecting those that
are supported by the data.
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Appendix
Appendix I: Proofs of Main Theorems
Proof of Theorem 1: Our setting is a special case of the setting in Nielsen (1989).
To show the existence of equilibrium Nielsen requires that preferences satisfy the
following three conditions: (i) each investors choice set is closed and convex, and
contains her initial endowment; (ii) The set of f 2 Rn+1 : U j ()  U j ( 0)g is closed
for all  0 2 Rn+1 and for all j = f1; :::; `g; (iii) If ;  0 2 Rn+1 and U j ( 0) > U j () ;
then U j(t 0 + (1  t)) > U j() for all t in (0; 1).
Condition (i) is satised in our setting since the choice set of each investor is
Rn+1, which is closed and convex, and contains ej for all j. Condition (ii) holds
since V is assumed continuous and R is assumed smooth, and so their composition
is continuous. Condition (iii) follows since V () is quasi-concave, strictly increasing
in its rst argument and strictly decreasing in its second argument, and R () is a
convex risk measure.
Given these properties of the preferences, Nielsen (1989) establishes two conditions
as su¢ cient for the existence of a quasi-equilibrium: (i) positive semi-independence
of directions of improvement, and (ii) non-satiation at Pareto attainable portfolios.
Condition (i) follows in our setting as in Nielsen (1990, Proposition 1) since in our set-
ting all investors agree on all parameters of the problem (in particular on the expected
returns), and due to the non-redundancy of risky assets assumption. To see why con-
dition (ii) holds in our setting note that we assume the existence of a risk-free asset
paying a non-zero payo¤ with probability 1. Since R () satises the risk-free prop-
erty, we have that R (~z1 + ~z2)  R (~z1) whenever ~z2 is risk-free with P (f~z2 > 0g) = 1.
Thus, adding a positive risk-free asset can only (weakly) reduce risk. It follows that
we can always add this positive risk-free asset to any bundle , strictly increasing the
expected return while weakly decreasing risk. This implies that in our model there
is no satiation globally. Thus, a quasi-equilibrium exists in our setting. Moreover,
any quasi-equilibrium is, in fact, an equilibrium in our setting. This follows from the
conditions in Nielsen (1989 p. 469). Indeed, in our setting each investors choice set
is convex and unbounded, and the set f 2 Rn+1 : U j () > U j ( 0)g is open for all j
and  0 2 Rn+1:
Proof of Theorem 2: Suppose that the equilibrium bundle of investor j is j: Let
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From the denition of equilibrium, each investor chooses j to maximize U j
 
j

subject to xj  p  ej; where by the positivity of prices xj = p  ej > 0 (using that
ej 2 Rn+1+ is not zero by assumption). From (23) and since V j is strictly increasing
in the rst argument and strictly decreasing in the second argument, we have that
for any positive xj; U j
 
j

is strictly increasing in E (j  ez) and strictly decreasing
in R (xj (j  ez)) : Therefore, in equilibrium, j must minimize R (xj (  ez)) for a
given level of expected return E (j  ez) : By scaling independence, this is equivalent
to minimizing R (  ez) for a given level of expected return, and thus, to solving
Problem (7). The solution is unique since we assumed that R () is a convex risk
measure, and so R (  ez) is convex as a function of :
Proof of Theorem 4: By the smoothness of R () and by Theorem 1, the solution
to Problem (7) for some j =  is determined by the rst order conditions. To solve
this program, form the Lagrangian
L () = R ()  
 
nX
i=1
iE (~zi) +
 
1 
nX
i=1
i
!
rf   
!
;
where  is a Lagrange multiplier. Equivalently,
L () = R
 
1 
nX
i=1
i; 1; :::; n
!
  
 
nX
i=1
iE (~zi) +
 
1 
nX
i=1
i
!
rf   
!
:
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The rst order condition states that for all i = 1; :::; n;
 R0 () +Ri ()   (E (~zi)  rf ) = 0; (24)
where  is any e¢ cient portfolio (the market portfolio being a special case). By the
risk-free property, R0 () = 0: Hence,
Ri (
) =  (E (~zi)  rf ) : (25)
It follows that
nX
i=1
iRi (
) = 
nX
i=1
i (E (~zi)  rf ) (26)
=  (E (ez )  rf ) :
From (25) and (26) we obtain
Ri (
)Pn
h=1 

hRh (
)
=
E (~zi)  rf
E (ez )  rf ;
as required. If R is homogeneous of degree k, then by Eulers homogeneous function
theorem and using the risk-free property this is also equivalent to
Ri (
)
kR ()
=
E (~zi)  rf
E (ez )  rf :
Proof of Theorem 5: The proof relies on a mapping between risk allocation prob-
lems as dened in Section 1.5.1 and cost allocation problems as dened in Billera and
Heath (1982, hereafter BH). Specically, BH dene a cost allocation problem of order
n as a pair (h;x) where h : Rn+ ! R is continuously di¤erentiable and h (0) = 0: Since
R is smooth and satises R (0) = 0 we can view any risk allocation problem, (R;x) ;
of order n; as a cost allocation problem as dened in BH by setting h (x) = R (x  ez) :
Given this mapping we will use (R;x) to denote both the risk allocation problem
and its corresponding cost allocation problem. BH dene a cost allocation proce-
dure as a function assigning each cost allocation problem (R;x) of order n a vector
c (R;x) 2 Rn: That is, c (R;x) should be interpreted as the cost allocated to each of
the n goods or services.
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We can then consider a natural mapping between systematic risk measures as
dened in Section 1.5.1 and the BH cost allocation procedures as follows. If BR (x)
is a systematic risk measure of the risk allocation problem (R;x) ; then
c (R;x) =
BR (x)R (x  ez)
x
(27)
is a cost allocation procedure for the corresponding cost allocation problem (R;x) :
Namely, risk allocation measures can be viewed as scaled versions of cost allocation
procedures for the corresponding problems.
Lemma 2 If a systematic risk measure BR (x) satises Axioms 1-4, then the corre-
sponding cost allocation procedure c (R;x) satises Conditions (2.1)-(2.4) in BH.
It is important to note that Axioms 1-4 and Conditions (2.1)-(2.4) in BH are not
equivalent to each other either as a group or individually. Rather, our four axioms as
a set are stronger than their four conditions as a set. The proof of this lemma follows
from the next four steps.
Step 1. Axiom 1 is satised if and only if Condition (2.1) in BH holds. Indeed,Pn
i=1 iBRi (x) = 1 is equivalent to
Pn
i=1
xiR(x)BRi (x)
x
= R (x) ; which using (27) is
equivalent to
Pn
i=1 xici (R;x) = R (x) : This is Condition (2.1).
Step 2. Axiom 2 is satised if and only if Condition (2.2) in BH holds. Indeed,
suppose R () = R1 () +R2 () and
BRi (x) =
R1 (x)
R (x)
BR1i (x) +
R2 (x)
R (x)
BR2i (x) :
Then
BRi (x)R (x)
x
=
R1 (x)BR1i (x)
x
+
R2 (x)BR2i (x)
x
:
That is,
ci (R;x) = ci
 
R1;x

+ ci
 
R2;x

;
which is Condition (2.2).
Step 3. Axioms 1 and 3 jointly imply Condition (2.3).
Assume that both Axioms 1 and 3 are satised and assume that for all  2 Rn+;
R (  ez) = g (  q) (28)
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for some function g () and a non-zero vector q 2 Rn+: Then, (~z1; :::; ~zn) are R-perfectly
correlated.
By Axiom 3 for all i; j = 1; :::; n;
qjBRi (x) = qiBRj (x) ; (29)
and hence
iqjBRi (x) = iqiBRj (x) :
Summing over i = 1; :::; n gives
qj
nX
i=1
iBRi (x) = (  q)BRj (x) : (30)
By Axiom 1 we know that
Pn
i=1 iBRi (x) = 1: Plugging this into (30) we have
qj = (  q)BRj (x) for j = 1; :::; n:
By (27), and recalling that R (x) 6= 0;
qj = (  q) cj (R;x) x
R (x)
= (x  q) cj (R;x)
R (x)
for j = 1; :::; n: (31)
If x q = 0 this implies that qj = 0 for all j; contradicting that q is a non-zero vector.
Hence, x  q is not zero. We then have
cj (R;x) =
qjR (x)
(x  q) for all j = 1; ::; n: (32)
Consider an asset with return ~w = xez
xq : Namely, investing x q dollars in this asset
yields the same return as of the portfolio x: Then,
R ((x  q) ~w) = R (x  ez) = g (x  q) :
Consider now the risk allocation problem of order 1 with the single asset ~w held at
the amount x  q: By Axiom 1 the systematic risk measure of this asset must satisfy
BR (x  q) = 1;
or equivalently using (27),
c (g;x  q) = R ((x  q) ~w)
x  q =
g (x  q)
x  q :
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Plugging back into (32) and using that R (x) = g (x  q) we have
cj (R;x) = c (g;x  q) qj:
This is exactly what Condition (2.3) in BH requires, restricting attention to the case
that q is a non-zero vector of non-negative integers.
Step 4. Axiom 4 is satised if and only if Condition (2.4) holds. This follows directly
from (27) and the denition of R-positive correlation.
Having established Lemma 2 we now turn to completing the proof of the theorem.
First, existence has been proved in the text by showing that (19) satises Axioms 1-4.
To show uniqueness note that Lemma 2 implies that Axioms 1-4 are jointly stronger
than Conditions (2.1)-(2.4) in BH. From BHs main result we know that there is a
unique cost allocation procedure c (R;x) satisfying Conditions (2.1)-(2.4). It follows
(using the mapping (27)) that there is a unique systematic risk measure satisfying
Axioms 1-4. Thus, the unique systematic risk measure is given by (19).
Finally, to see that (19) and (20) are equivalent when R is homogeneous of degree
k; note rst that in this caseZ 1
0
Ri (tx1; :::; txn) dt = Ri (x1; :::; xn)
Z 1
0
tk 1dt
=
Ri (x1; :::; xn)
k
;
where the rst equality follows since Ri is homogeneous of degree k   1: It follows
that
BRi (x) =
x
R 1
0
Ri (tx1; :::; txn) dt
R (x1; :::; xn)
=
xRi (x1; :::; xn)
kR (x1; :::; xn)
=
xRi (x1; :::; xn)
kR (x1; :::; xn)
=
Ri (1; :::; n)
kR (1; :::; n)
=
Ri (1; :::; n)Pn
h=1 hRh (1; :::; n)
;
where the penultimate equality follows from the homogeneity of degrees k and k   1
of R and Ri respectively, and the last equality follows from Eulers homogeneous
function theorem. This completes the proof of Theorem 5.
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Appendix II: Other Proofs and Derivations
Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1: We need to show that for any random returns ~z1 and ~z2;
and any 0 <  < 1,
wk (~z1 + (1  ) ~z2)  wk (~z1) + (1  )wk (~z2) : (33)
Letting z^1 = ~z1   E (~z1) and z^2 = ~z2   E (~z2) ; (33) can be rewritten as
E
h
(z^1 + (1  ) z^2)k
i 1
k    E z^k1 1k + (1  )  E z^k2 1k : (34)
Applying the binomial formula to the LHS of (34) implies that we need to show 
kX
i=0

k
i

k i (1  )i E  z^k i1 z^i2
! 1
k
   E z^k1 1k + (1  )  E z^k2 1k :
Since k is even, replacing each z^1 and z^2 with jz^1j and jz^2j will not a¤ect the RHS,
but it might increase the LHS. So, it is su¢ cient to show that 
kX
i=0

k
i

k i (1  )i E  z^k i1 z^i2
! 1
k
 

E
h
jz^1jk
i 1
k
+ (1  )

E
h
jz^2jk
i 1
k
:
Since both sides are positive we can raise both sides to the kth power, maintaining
the inequality. Thus, it would be su¢ cient to show
kX
i=0

k
i

k i (1  )i E  z^k i1 z^i2  E hjz^1jki 1k + (1  )E hjz^2jki 1kk :
Applying the binomial formula to the RHS implies that it would be su¢ cient to show
kX
i=0

k
i

k i (1  )i E  z^k i1 z^i2  kX
i=0

k
i

k i (1  )i

E
h
jz^1jk
i k i
k

E
h
jz^2jk
i i
k
:
To establish this inequality we will show that it actually holds term by term. That
is, it is su¢ cient to show that for each i = 0; :::; k;
E
 z^k i1 z^i2  E hjz^1jki k ik E hjz^2jki ik :
To see this, note that it is equivalent to show that
E
 z^k i1 z^i2  E hz^k i1  kk ii k ik E hz^i2 ki i ik :
43
But, this is immediate from Hölders inequality, and we are done.
Proof of Proposition 2: For any integer k  2; we can rewrite the downside risk
measure as
DRk (~z) = ( 1)k

E
 
[~z   E (~z)] k 1k = E  [E (~z)  ~z]+k 1k ;
where [t]+ = max (t; 0) for t 2 R:
Consider any two random returns ~z1 and ~z2; and let z^1 = [E (~z1)  ~z1]+ and
z^2 = [E (~z2)  ~z2]+ : Obviously, we have z^1  0 and z^2  0: What we need to show is
that for any 0 <  < 1,
E
 
[E (~z1 + (1  ) ~z2)  ~z1   (1  ) ~z2]+
k 1k    E  z^k1 1k+(1  )  E  z^k2 1k :
Now,
[E (~z1 + (1  ) ~z2)  ~z1   (1  ) ~z2]+ = [ (E (~z1)  ~z1) + (1  ) (E (~z2)  ~z2)]+
  [E (~z1)  ~z1]+ + (1  ) [E (~z2)  ~z2]+
= z^1 + (1  ) z^2;
where the inequality follows from Jensens inequality using that []+ is a convex func-
tion.
Therefore, it is su¢ cient to show that
E (z^1 + (1  ) z^2)k
 1
k    E  z^k1 1k + (1  )  E  z^k2 1k :
The rest of the proof follows closely the proof of Proposition 1. Indeed, since z^1 and
z^2 are non-negative here, the arguments in the proof of Proposition 1 apply in this
case to any positive k (odd or even).
Proof of Proposition 3: In the denition of expected shortfall we assumed the
existence of a cumulative distribution function F () applied to realizations of random
variables. For the sake of this proof it will be more useful to work directly with the
state space 
 and with the underlying probability measure P () :We rst prove that
ES(~z) is subadditive. That is, for any two random returns ~z1 and ~z2;
ES(~z1 + ~z2)  ES(~z1) + ES(~z2): (35)
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If either ~z1 or ~z2 is equal to a constant with probability 1, then the result is immediate.
We shall thus only consider the case in which both of them are not equal to a constant.
By (3), for any random return ~z (which is not constant), ES (~z) can be expressed as
ES (~z) =  1

Z
f!:~z VaR(~z)g
~zdP (!) :
Let ~z1 and ~z2 be random returns and dene ~z3 = ~z1 + ~z2: Let

i = f! 2 
 : ~zi   VaR (~zi)g ;
for i = 1; 2; 3. Then, (35) is equivalent toZ

3
~z3dP (!) 
Z

1
~z1dP (!) +
Z

2
~z2dP (!) ;
which can be rewritten asZ

3
~z1dP (!) +
Z

3
~z2dP (!) 
Z

1
~z1dP (!) +
Z

2
~z2dP (!) :
It is su¢ cient to show that Z

3
~z1dP (!) 
Z

1
~z1dP (!) ; (36)
and Z

3
~z2dP (!) 
Z

2
~z2dP (!) : (37)
For brevity, we will only prove (36). The proof of (37) is parallel.
Dene

4 = f! 2 
 : ~z1   VaR (~z1) ; ~z3   VaR (~z3)g ;

5 = f! 2 
 : ~z1   VaR (~z1) ; ~z3 >  VaR (~z3)g ; and

6 = f! 2 
 : ~z1 >  VaR (~z1) ; ~z3   VaR (~z3)g :
Clearly, 
4 \ 
5 = ?; 
4 [ 
5 = 
1; 
4 \ 
6 = ?; and 
4 [ 
6 = 
3: Thus,Z

1
dP (!) =
Z

4
dP (!) +
Z

5
dP (!) ;
and Z

3
dP (!) =
Z

4
dP (!) +
Z

6
dP (!) :
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By the denition of VaR, we knowZ

1
dP (!) =
Z

3
dP (!) = :
Thus, we obtain Z

5
dP (!) =
Z

6
dP (!) : (38)
Similarly, we have Z

1
~z1dP (!) =
Z

4
~z1dP (!) +
Z

5
~z1dP (!) ;
and Z

3
~z1dP (!) =
Z

4
~z1dP (!) +
Z

6
~z1dP (!) :
Hence, Z

1
~z1dP (!) 
Z

3
~z1dP (!)
=
Z

5
~z1dP (!) 
Z

6
~z1dP (!)

Z

5
[ VaR (~z1)] dP (!) 
Z

6
[ VaR (~z1)] dP (!)
=  VaR (~z1)
Z

5
dP (!) 
Z

6
dP (!)

= 0;
where the inequality follows from ~z1   VaR (~z1) when ! 2 
5 and ~z1 >  VaR (~z1)
when ! 2 
6; and where the last equality follows from (38). Therefore, (36) is
obtained, and hence ES(~z) is subadditive. Since DES(~z) = ES(~z) + E(~z) we have
that DES is also subadditive.
Convexity now follows immediately from homogeneity of degree 1 and subaddi-
tivity.
Derivations of Systematic Risk for Applications IV
Here we provide derivations of the systematic risk associated with di¤erent risk mea-
sures discussed in Section 1.4.3.
Application I: This is a special case of Application II.
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Application II: Consider the risk measure R (~z) = mk (~z) for even k  2: The risk
of the market portfolio is
R
 
M  ez = mk  M  ez = E  M  ez  E  M  ezk :
Di¤erentiating with respect to the weight of asset i yields
@mk
 
M  ez
@Mi
= kE
h
(~zi   E (~zi))
 
M  ez  E  M  ezk 1i
= kCov

~zi;

M  ez M  E (ez)k 1 :
By Theorem 4, and since mk () is homogeneous of degree k; the systematic risk is
then given by
BRi =
@mk(M ez)
@Mi
kmk (M  ez) =
Cov

~zi;

M  ez M  E (ez)k 1
mk (M  ez) ; (39)
as required.
Now suppose alternatively that R (~z) = wk (~z) : The market portfolio risk is
R
 
M  ez = wk  M  ez =  mk  M  ez 1k :
Di¤erentiating with respect to the weight of asset i gives
@wk
 
M  ez
@Mi
=
1
k
 
mk
 
M  ez 1k 1 @mk  M  ez
@Mi
:
By Theorem 4, and since wk () is homogeneous of degree 1, the systematic risk is
BRi =
1
k
 
mk
 
M  ez 1k 1 @mk(M ez)
@Mi
(mk (M  ez)) 1k =
@mk(M ez)
@Mi
kmk (M  ez) ;
which is identical to (39).
Application III: Assume R (~z) = DRk (~z) for k  2: The risk of the market portfolio
M is given by
DRk
 
M  ez = ( 1)k EM  ez  E  M  ez k 1k :
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Di¤erentiating with respect to Mi gives
21
@DRk
 
M  ez
@Mi
= ( 1)k

E

M  ez  E  M  ez k 1k 1
E

(~zi   E (~zi))

M  ez  E  M  ez k 1
= ( 1)k

E

M  ez  E  M  ez k 1k 1
Cov

~zi;

M  ez  E  M  ez k 1 :
By Theorem 4, and since DRk () is homogeneous of degree 1, the systematic risk is
given by
BRi =
@DRk(M ez)
@Mi
DRk (M  ez)
=
Cov

~zi;

M  ez  E  M  ez k 1
E
 
[M  ez  E (M  ez)] k
= ( 1)k
Cov

~zi;

M  ez  E  M  ez k 1
(DRk (M  ez))k :
Application IV: Assume R (~z) = DES (~z) for some condence level 0 <  < 1: Let
f(z1; :::; zn) denote the joint density function of ez: Since all risky assets have positive
net supply and since asset prices are positive, we have M1 > 0: Hence, the risk of the
21Note that we are essentially relying here on Leibnizs rule for di¤erentiation under the integral.
While

M  z  E  M  ez k is not everywhere di¤erentiable, it is continuous and di¤erentiable
almost everywhere. This guarantees that Leibnizs rule applies.
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market portfolio M can be written as follows
DES(
M  ez)
= ES(
M  ez) + E  M  ez
=  1

Z +1
 1
:::
Z +1
 1
Z  VaR(M ez) Pnj=2 Mj zj
M1
 1 
nX
j=1
Mj zj   E
 
M  ez! f(z1; :::; zn)dz1:::dzn:
Di¤erentiating DES(M  ez) using Leibnizs rule with respect to Mi yields
@DES(
M  ez)
@Mi
(40)
=  1

Z +1
 1
:::
Z +1
 1
Z  VaR(M ez) Pnj=2 Mj zj
M1
 1
(zi   E (~zi)) f(z1; :::; zn)dz1:::dzn
+
VaR(
M  ez) + E  M  ez

@
@Mi

0@Z +1
 1
:::
Z +1
 1
Z  VaR(M ez) Pnj=2 Mj zj
M1
 1
f(z1; :::; zn)dz1:::dzn
1A :
Notice that by the denition of VaR(M  ez);Z +1
 1
:::
Z +1
 1
Z  VaR(M ez) Pnj=2 Mj zj
M1
 1
f(z1; :::; zn)dz1:::dzn = ;
which is a constant, implying that the second term in (40) is zero. Thus,
@DES(
M  ez)
@Mi
=  1

Z +1
 1
:::
Z +1
 1
Z  VaR(M ez) Pnj=2 Mj zj
M1
 1
(zi   E (~zi)) f(z1; :::; zn)dz1:::dzn
=  1

E

1M ez VaR(M ez) (zi   E (~zi))
=  E ~zi   E (~zi) jM  ez   VaR(M  ez) :
By Theorem 4, and since DES(M ez) is homogeneous of degree 1, the systematic
risk is given by
BRi =
@DES(
M ez)
@Mi
DES(M  ez) =  E

~zi   E (~zi) jM  ez   VaR(M  ez)
DES(M  ez) :
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Application V: Consider the following family of risk measures
R (~z) = 1w2 (~z) + 2DR3 (~z) + 3w4 (~z) + 4DES (~z)
for some condence level  and non-negative weights 1; :::; 4. From Lemma 1, this
family of risk measures satises all of the conditions in Theorem 4. Moreover, it is
easy to verify that when
R (~z) =
sX
j=1
Rj (~z) ;
the expression for BRi given in (10) implies
BRi =
sX
j=1
Rj
 
M  ez
R (M  ez) BRji :
That is, the systematic risk takes the form of the risk-weighted average of the sys-
tematic risk associated with each of the risk components. (See also Section 1.5.1 for
further discussion of this issue as it relates to Axiom 2 in that section.)
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Internet Appendix
Mean-Risk Preferences and Expected Utility
Background One would wonder how the mean-risk preferences considered in
Section 1.4 are related to the commonly assumed von Neumann-Morgenstern utility.
It is widely known that a von Neumann-Morgenstern investor with a quadratic utility
function only cares about the mean and the variance of his investments in the sense
that he prefers a high expected wealth and a low variance. In this sense, the mean-risk
preference is consistent with the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility when variance is
used as the risk measure. Alternatively, when returns are distributed according to
a two-parameter elliptical distribution (normal being a special case), mean-variance
preferences can also be supported by expected utility. These instances, however,
are quite restrictive. First, the quadratic utility is not very intuitive since it implies
increasing absolute risk aversion. Second, elliptical distributions, being determined by
the rst two moments only, limit our ability to describe the dependence of risk on high
distribution moments and other risk characteristics. Thus, in general, mean-variance
preferences are not consistent with expect utility. The approach taken in this paper
is much more general, allowing for a variety of risk measures. Whether a particular
risk measure is consistent with expected utility depends on the actual choice of the
risk measure. For example, risk measures that are simple linear combinations of raw
moments up to the kth degree can be represented by a kth degree polynomial (Müller
and Machina (1987)), generalizing the mean-variance result.
While in general the preferences dened in (6) cannot be supported by expected
utility, they are often consistent with expected utility locally. The idea is based on
Machinas (1982) Local Utility Function.To facilitate this approach we rst restrict
attention to risk measures that depend on the distribution of the random variables
only. Thus, we consider risk measures that are functions from the distribution of
realizations to the reals rather than functions from the random variables themselves.
Practically, this does not present a binding restriction since all the examples in this
paper and all standard risk measures only rely on the distribution of realizations
anyway. In this case the preferences in (6) can be written as
U () = V (E (Fey) ; R (Fey)) ;
where Fey is the cumulative distribution of the random variable   ey: When the
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random variable of interest is clear, we will omit it from the notation and write the
utility as U (F ) = V (E (F ) ; R (F )) :
According to Machina (1982), if the realizations of all random variables are con-
tained in some bounded and closed interval I and U (F ) is Fréchet di¤erentiable with
respect to the L1 norm,22 then for any two distributions F1; F2 on I there exists
u (;F1) di¤erentiable almost everywhere on I such that
U (F2)  U (F1) =
Z
I
u (y;F1) dF2 (y) 
Z
I
u (y;F1) dF1 (y) + o (kF2   F1k) ; (41)
where kk denotes the L1 norm. That is, starting from a wealth distribution F1; if an
investor moves to another closedistribution F2, then he compares the utility from
these two distributions as if he is maximizing his expected utility with a local utility
function u (;F1) :
The key to applying Machinas result is to nd su¢ cient conditions on the risk
measure which guarantee that U (F ) is Fréchet di¤erentiable. This can be done in
many ways. Next we provide one simple but e¤ective approach which is su¢ cient to
validate many popular risk measures as consistent with local expected utility.
Risk Measures as Functions of Moments Let Fk =
R
ykdF (y) be the kth
raw moment given distribution F; and mFk =
R  
y   F1
k
dF (y) be the kth cen-
tral moment given distribution F: Consider risk measures which are a function of
a nite number of (raw or central) moments. We denote such risk measures by
R
 
Fj1 ; :::; 
F
jl
;mFk1 ; :::;m
F
kn

. We assume that R is di¤erentiable in all arguments.
The utility function in (6) then takes the form
U (F ) = V
 
F1 ; R
 
Fj1 ; :::; 
F
jl
;mFk1 ; :::;m
F
kn

; (42)
where V is di¤erentiable in both mean and risk. This class of utility functions is
quite general and it allows the risk measure to depend on a large number of high
distribution moments. We then have the following proposition.
Proposition 4 If U (F ) takes the form (42) then for any two distributions F1; F2 on
I there exists u (;F1) di¤erentiable almost everywhere on I such that (41) holds.
22Fréchet di¤erentiability is an innite dimensional version of di¤erentiability. The idea here is
that U (F ) changes smoothly with F; where changes in F are topologized using the L1 norm. See
Luenberger (1969, p. 171).
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Proof: We need to show that U (F ) is Fréchet di¤erentiable. By the chain rule for
Fréchet di¤erentiability (Luenberger (1969, p. 176)), we know that if both Fk and
mFk are Fréchet di¤erentiable for any k; then so is U () : The Fréchet di¤erentiability
of Fk is obvious, since
F2k   F1k =
Z
I
ykdF2 (y) 
Z
I
ykdF1 (y) =  k
Z
I
(F2 (y)  F1 (y)) yk 1dy:
Now we show that mFk is Fréchet di¤erentiable. We have
mFk =
Z  
y   F1
k
dF (y)
=
Z kX
i=0
k!
i! (k   i)!y
i
 
F1
k i
dF (y)
=
kX
i=0
k!
i! (k   i)!
 
F1
k i Z
yidF (y)
=
kX
i=0
k!
i! (k   i)!
 
F1
k i
Fi ;
which is a di¤erentiable function of the Fi s. By the chain rule, it follows immediately
that mFk is also Fréchet di¤erentiable. This completes the proof.
Su¢ cient Conditions for Positive Prices
Here we provide a su¢ cient condition for the positivity of equilibrium prices following
the approach of Nielsen (1992). Let  2 Rn+1 be a bundle. Denote the gradient of
investor js utility function at  by rUj () = (U j0 () ; :::; U jn ()), where a subscript
designates a partial derivative in the direction of the ith asset. Also, let j () =
 V j2 (E(ey);R(ey))
V j1 (E(ey);R(ey)) > 0 be the marginal rate of substitution of the expected payo¤ of
the bundle for the risk of the bundle. This is the slope of investor j0s indi¤erence
curve in the expected payo¤-risk space. For brevity we often omit the arguments of
this expression and use j () =  V j2
V j1
:
Proposition 5 Assume that for each asset i there is some investor j such that
E(~yi) > 
j ()Ri (  ey) for all . Then, prices of all assets are positive in all equi-
libria.
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Proof: At an equilibrium, all investorsgradients point in the direction of the price
vector. So the price of asset i must be positive in any equilibrium if there is some
investor j such that U ji () > 0 for all : Recall that
U j () = V j (E (  ey) ; R (  ey)) :
Thus,
U ji () = V
j
1 E(~yi) + V
j
2 Ri (  ey)
= V j1 [E(~yi)  j ()Ri (  ey)];
where Ri (  ey) denotes the partial derivative of R (  ey) with respect to  i:
Since V j1 > 0, U
j
i () > 0 corresponds to
E(~yi)  j ()Ri (  ey) > 0;
as required.
Note that j () can serve as a measure of risk aversion for investor j. We can thus
interpret this proposition as follows. If each assets expected return is su¢ ciently high
relative to some investors risk aversion and the marginal contribution of the asset to
total risk, then this asset will always be desirable by some investor, and so, its price
will be positive in any equilibrium.
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2 Signaling with Dynamic Payo¤s and Entrepre-
neurial Compensation
2.1 Introduction
Entrepreneurial compensation is a topic that has drawn academic interest but not
been much studied. A number of stylized facts were discovered while unexplained.
Indeed, as Wasserman (2004) point out, there is tremendous cross-sectional variation
in entrepreneurial compensation, particularly in terms of the relative scale between
equity-based and cash-based pay, although explanation for such variation is yet to be
provided.
In addition, an emerging area of entrepreneurial study is the "Search Fund" model
(Stanford Graduate School of Business, 2012), where a group of investors nancially
back a searcher-entrepreneur, typically straightly out of a MBA program, to search
for an existing small business to invest, operate, and grow. During this search stage,
the entrepreneur draws a salary from the capital provided by the investors as well
as shares an equity stake in the target business. Historically, targets have resided
in a wide range of industries, from burger diners, to nursing homes, and to software
development shops. Interestingly, this cash-versus-equity-pay also di¤ers substan-
tially across these industries. A natural question is therefore how to explain this
cross-sectional variation.
One may be tempted to borrow the results from the executive compensation liter-
ature. In particular, the seminal work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Holmstrom
(1979) provided an agency-theoretic perspective, addressing the moral hazard prob-
lem as to why it is important to provide incentive for e¤ort exertion. Prendergast
(1999, 2002) further adds to the discussion by pointing out the trade-o¤ between risk
and incentives. However, these insights do not seem to translate directly to entrepre-
neurial compensation, and the reason is small business uniqueness. Indeed, as Ang
(1991) argues, the issue of misaligned incentive is less serious in small rms than in
large rms because of the high concentration, both nancially and operationally, that
the entrepreneur is involved with his or her rm. Moreover, the issue of risk aversion
is essentially inapplicable since entrepreneurs and corporate executives intrinsically
have distinct risk preferences, where the former are much less risk-averse (if they are
not even risk-seeking) than the latter. Indeed, a number of studies have supported
such risk preferences, such as Kanbur (1979), Blanchower and Oswald (1998), and
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Cramer et. al (2002). A more serious issue is asymmetric information, as Ang (1991)
also suggests, where entrepreneurs know signicantly more than investors and other
sorts of monitoring such as analyst coverage are absent.
Therefore, this paper provides an asymmetric-information perspective to study
entrepreneurial compensation. Essentially, as anecdotal evidence suggests,23 unin-
formed investors tend to rely on compensation structure as a signal to distinguish
among di¤erent types of informed entrepreneurs. Furthermore, an interesting trade-
o¤ between current and future payo¤s is modeled, where it manifests itself in the
balance of cash-based pay (current) versus equity-based pay (deferred). Intuitively, a
"high-type" entrepreneur, ceteris paribus, is likely more willing to accept equity pay
due to better ability in growing the rm and consequently a larger pie to share from
in the future.
The signal literature originates from Akerlofs (1970) seminal work, which sug-
gests that in a market with asymmetric information, if the informed party cannot
communicate the private information to the uninformed party, then a breakdown can
occur due to adverse selection. Since then, various signaling models have been pro-
posed. For example, Spence (1974) and subsequently Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976),
Leland and Pyle (1977), Riley (1979), Wilson (1980), and Ofer and Thakor (1987),
among others, address this issue by showing that a fully revealing signaling equi-
librium can exist, where the uninformed know in equilibrium the true types of the
informed. However, the signal is dissipative in that there has to be deadweight loss
relative to the "rst-best" situation in order for the signal to be e¤ective. The reason
is that, by their very being, the low types cause an externality such that the high
types are worse o¤ than they would be in the absence of the low types while the
low types are no better o¤ than they would be in the absence of the high types.
In contrast, Bhattacharya (1980), Heinkel (1982), Brennan and Kraus (1987), and
Franke (1987) obtain nondissipative revealing signaling equilibrium. Nevertheless,
they impose exogenous conditions on the behavior of the uninformed, such as being
able to penalize the informed ex post.
The signaling model in this paper, while built on existing studies, has some in-
teresting features. In particular, a market breakdown will not happen, but both
separating and pooling equilibria are possible, and consequently, an equilibrium is
not necessarily informationally consistent (i.e., fully revealing). Furthermore, when
23Venture Capital Panel Discussion, Skandalaris Center for Entrepreneurial Studies, 2009.
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an equilibrium is indeed revealing, whether the signal is dissipative or nondissipative
is completely endogenous.
Essentially, it is this dynamic payo¤ structure embedding the trade-o¤ between
present pay and future pay that results in these features. If we are concerned with
only one single payo¤, such as that in Spence (1974), then a market will break down
unless the informed can signal the private information. In addition, the signal needs
to be costly to be e¤ective.24 However, if two payo¤s (trading o¤ each other, such
as today versus tomorrow) are in the picture, then there may exist self-selections
where one type prefers one payo¤while the other type prefers the other, as indicated
in Salop and Salop (1976). Then the choice of the payo¤ structure of the informed
serves as a natural signal, which is therefore nondissipative, i.e., mimicking the good
type may simply be outside the bad types optimal course of actions. Nevertheless,
I do not impose such preferences directly; rather, the case with nondissipative signal
arises endogenously depending on the extent of this trade-o¤.
I employ a continuous-time framework where the informed agent can a¤ect the
capital stock process associated with an entrepreneurial project through only its drift.
The capital accumulation at each point in time is thus uninformative about the
informed agents private information. The agent chooses a compensation policy which
sets her salary rate as well as shapes the course of reinvestment into the project. This
reinvestment in turn a¤ects the drift of capital accumulation. The agents private
information relates to an entrepreneurial technology which determines its obsolescence
rate. Put di¤erently, this private information determines how relevant the agent is
to the project over time. Indeed, this rate impacts the valuation of the project when
the entrepreneur retires, which determines her terminal payo¤. The agent therefore
is explicitly concerned with this intertemporal trade-o¤ between current pay and
deferred pay.
The game-theoretic feature of the model manifests itself in a signaling game where
the uninformed agent moves rst by precommitting to a valuation for each compen-
sation policy. This is appropriate in the entrepreneurial setting given that the two
parties sign a contract upon the initiation of the entrepreneurs engagement, which
states the salary rates as well as the terminal valuation of the technology. In other
words, the uninformed investors o¤er a menu of salary-valuation contracts, and then
the informed entrepreneur chooses among these contracts to signal her type. As for
24Unless the uninformed can somehow penalize dishonesty upon seeing the result ex post.
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equilibrium concepts, the study primarily employs the Riley Reactive equilibrium
(Riley (1979)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the formulation
of the model and solves for the case with symmetric information. Section 2.3 denes
an equilibrium with asymmetric information and details the equilibrium analysis.
Model extensions and empirical predictions of the analysis are in Section 2.4. Section
2.5 concludes.
2.2 Model Formulation
2.2.1 Agents and Technological Possibilities
The economy carries a continuum of investors. There are also some entrepreneurs,
each having a project that requires an initial capital of K0 > 0. Without the entre-
preneur, the project is valueless to the investors. The interpretation is that it is a
piece of knowledge or innovation that is potentially commercializable. So although it
is valuable, it does not generate revenue without the know-hows of an entrepreneur.
There are two types of entrepreneurs, H (for high) and L (for low). After the
project is initiated, it generates cash ows at any time t via a constant rate h > 0
that is common to both types.25 The two types di¤er, however, by an entrepreneurial
technology that determines the obsolescence rate i > 0 of the projects capital,
where i 2 fH;Lg and H < L  h.26 This information on types is private with
the entrepreneur, although investors know the values of H and L as well as the
proportion of the high type, denoted by  2 (0; 1).
We can interpret this obsolescence rate in primarily two ways. First, in terms of
intangible assets such as patents and goodwill, a better technology leads to better
management of them and thus adds to the livelihood of the project. Second, in terms
of operation strategies, a better entrepreneur can operate the project more e¢ ciently
in such a way it is not easily replicated.
For the cash ows generated at each point in time, the entrepreneur has a decision
to make. She can either compensate herself or reinvest into the project or both. Let
t denote her salary rate at time t. Then the projects capital stock evolves according
25Since only with the entrepreneurs evolvement are these cash ows possible and the investors
are perfectly competitive, any surplus goes to the entrepreneur.
26If i > h, then it is not a viable technology and the entrepreneur simply should not undertake
the project to begin with.
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to
dKt = (It   iKt)dt+ KtdZt; (43)
where It = (h  t)Kt is (re)investment amount, i 2 fH;Lg,  is a volatility parame-
ter, and Zt is a standard Brownian motion. Furthermore, I assume that there is no
debt market, so the entrepreneur cannot borrow to reinvest, and thus, 0  t  h.
Substituting It into (43), we have
dKt = (h  t   i)Ktdt+ KtdZt: (44)
The capital accumulation specication (44) is similar to that in Cox, Ingersoll,
and Ross (1985) and Sundaresan (1984), where uncertainty of capital accumulation
is proportional to the level of capital stock. It is in contrast with that in Albuquerue
and Wang (2008), which is a continuous-time version of Greenwood, Hercowitz, and
Hu¤man (1988) and Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997, 2000), where volatility
depends on I instead of K. But then the entrepreneur has the option to avoid
uncertainty by always investing zero amount. My specication reects the fact that
the entrepreneur cannot (perfectly) control the volatility of capital accumulation.
Consequently, even though the investors can observe Kt at each time point t, they
cannot infer i based on this information.
An entrepreneur cannot develop the project forever. I assume that with a Poisson
arrival rate, , her involvement is terminated. We can think of this as her unforesee-
able retirement need due to circumstances like health condition. Also, one simple way
to illustrate this is that a xed termination date cannot be written into the contract.
In any case, the essence of this assumption is that the termination is not motivated by
the entrepreneurs private knowledge of the quality of her entrepreneurial technology.
Then, since there is a continuum of investors, when the time for termination comes,
the investors are only concerned with breaking even,27 in which case the terminal
value of the project is paid to the entrepreneur. This "fair" terminal value of the
project takes into account both the capital stock at the time of termination and the
projects growth potential. The latter depends on the projects technology, through
the obsolescence rate i, as the lower this rate is, the higher the e¤ective growth rate
of the project.
27Alternatively, we can assume that the investors and the entrepreneurs engage in a Nash bar-
gainning game. The results will clearly be more complicated although qualitatively similar.
59
Moreover, in line with the assumption that the investors cannot develop the
project unless they hire an entrepreneur, I assume that only the entrepreneur pos-
sesses the specic know-hows on how to reinvest in the project. So any reinvestment
is productive only if the entrepreneur is operating the project. Thus, when the en-
trepreneur retires, the investors will not reinvest. E¤ectively, investors are valuing
the project for its future stream of cash ows paid out for example in the form of
dividends.28 The terminal value of the project can then be calculated using the Gor-
don model (Gordon (1959)). Formally, let  denote the time of the termination. The
capital stock of the project after this termination will evolve as
dKt = ( i)Ktdt+ KtdZt; (45)
for t   . The expected value of the stream of future cash ows at  is
E [
Z 1
t=
hKtdt]; (46)
which can be solved in closed-form, as in the following lemma. Intuitively, the higher
is the rate of cash ows, and the lower is the obsolescence rate, the higher the terminal
value is.
Lemma 3 The terminal value of the project at time  is h
i
K .
Proof. See Appendix.
2.2.2 The Entrepreneurs Problem
Let u1 and u2 denote the entrepreneurs subutility functions for salary streams and
proceeds from the terminal value. Then given the initial capital K0 > 0, the entre-
preneurs problem is to choose adapted salary rates ftg to
maxE[
Z 
t=0
e tu1(tKt)dt+ e
 u2(
h
i
K )] (47)
s:t:
dKt = (h  t   i)Ktdt+ KtdZt
0  t  h
Kt  0;
28Of course, the benets associated with some projects may be non-pecuniary, so we assume a
monetary value for each of them.
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where  is the natural rate of discount. As noted above, the terminal value recognizes
the impact of the entrepreneurial technology. Ceteris paribus, in particular for the
same amount of capital accumulation, a high type merits a higher terminal payo¤
than that of a low type. The last constraint, i.e., the nonnegativity of capital stock,
reects the fact that the entrepreneurs problem is null if the project is no longer
viable.
Moreover, since termination occurs with Poisson arrival rate  > 0, we have
Pr(  s) = 1  e s, which implies that (47) can be written equivalently as
E[
Z 1
s=0
e s su1(sKs)ds+
Z 1
s=0
e s su2(
h
i
Ks)ds];
which upon simplifying becomes
Ef
Z 1
s=0
e s s[u1(sKs) + u2(
h
i
Ks)]dsg: (48)
Assume further that the entrepreneur possesses linear utility over nonnegative
wealth,29 that is, uj(c) = c, for c 2 [0;1), j 2 f1; 2g. Then, (48) becomes
E[
Z 1
s=0
e s s(sKs + 
h
i
Ks)ds]:
2.2.3 Optimal Strategies with Symmetric Information
Let us rst solve the entrepreneurs problem assuming that there is symmetric infor-
mation between the entrepreneurs and the investors. We can specify the entrepre-
neurs problem above as Problem 1.
Problem 1. Given K0 > 0, choose ftg to
maxE[
Z 1
s=0
e s s(sKs + 
h
i
Ks)ds]
s:t:
dKt = (h  t   i)Ktdt+ KtdZt
0  t  h
Kt  0:
Note that we can apply homogeneity and thus alternatively characterize this prob-
lem as Problem 2.
29This is similar to risk neutrality but not exactly the same, since risk neutrality requires linear
utility over the entire real line. But the essence of the linear utility here is to rid risk aversion.
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Problem 2. Given K0 > 0, choose ftg to
maxK0E[
Z 1
s=0
e s s(s
Ks
K0
+ 
h
i
Ks
K0
)ds]
s:t:
d(
Kt
K0
) = (h  t   i)
Kt
K0
dt+ 
Kt
K0
dZt
0  t  h
Kt
K0
 0:
Thus, given that K is the only state variable and letting V (K) denote the value
function, we have V (K0) = K0V (1). That is, the value function, as a function of K0,
is equal to K0 multiplied by the value function evaluated at K0 = 1. Thus, since the
problem is stationary, the value function takes the form
V (K) = CK (49)
for some constant C. That is, the value function is linear in K.
We then obtain the closed-form solution to the entrepreneurs problem, summa-
rized in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 If i 
p
(+ h)2+4h (+ h)
2
, then C =
 h
i
++i h , i.e., V (K) =
 h
i
++i hK. In this case, the optimal strategy is 

t = 0, 8t. If i >
p
(+ h)2+4h (+ h)
2
,
then C =
 h
i
+h
++i
, i.e., V (K) =
 h
i
+h
++i
K. In this case, the optimal strategy is t = h,
8t.
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, under symmetric information, when the entrepreneurial technology is
highly valuable so that it becomes obsolete at a rather slow rate, it e¤ectively scales
up the terminal payo¤ as the investors value the promising growth prospects. This
incentivizes the entrepreneur to accumulate capital stock, and as a result she chooses
to compensate herself nothing until termination. However, when the technology is
not very valuable, it becomes obsolete rather quickly, and the benet of accumulating
capital stock to scale up terminal payo¤ is limited. Yet doing so is costly, since she
has to give up compensation which after all carries time value. Therefore, when the
cost dominates the benet, she chooses to consume all cash ows at each point in
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time. As it is standard in the literature, let us call these strategies the rst best
strategies, denoted by iFB, for i 2 fH;Lg. In addition, we call this threshold the
rst best threshold and denote it by , that is,
 =
p
(+   h)2 + 4h  (+   h)
2
:
2.3 Equilibrium with Asymmetric Information
Let us now turn to the case where there is informational asymmetry between the
entrepreneurs and the investors. Due to this asymmetric information, the investors
are concerned with being "fooled" by the entrepreneurs. Moreover, since the investors
cannot infer the value of the entrepreneurs technology based on the capital stock, the
only available signal is her compensation structure. Thus, at the initial undertaking
of the project, the two parties sign a contract stating the salary rate as well as the
terminal valuation of the technology. From now on, therefore, we consider a signaling
model between the entrepreneurs and the investors.
The literature has witnessed extensive studies on signaling models. Indeed, ever
since Akerlofs (1970) suggestion that in a market with asymmetric information a
breakdown can occur due to adverse selection if the informed party cannot communi-
cate the private information to the uninformed party, various signaling models have
been proposed. For example, Spence (1974) and subsequently Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976), Riley (1979), Wilson (1980), and Ofer and Thakor (1987), among others, ad-
dress this issue by showing that a fully revealing signaling equilibrium can exist,
where the uninformed know in equilibrium the true types of the informed. However,
the signal is dissipative in that there has to be deadweight loss relative to the rst
best in order for the signal to be e¤ective. In contrast, Bhattacharya (1980), Heinkel
(1982), Brennan and Kraus (1987), and Franke (1987) obtain nondissipative revealing
signaling equilibrium, although they impose exogenous conditions on the behavior of
the uninformed, such as being able to penalize the informed ex post.
Intuitively, if the informed is concerned with only one payo¤, then a market will
break down unless the informed can signal the private information. In addition, the
signal will be costly unless the uninformed can somehow penalize dishonesty upon
seeing the result ex post. However, if there are dynamic payo¤s, as it is the case in this
study, then the market may not break down since in equilibrium either information
will be revealed or it is the best course of actions for both types to behave similarly.
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Furthermore, there can exist self-selections that naturally signal and separate types,
making the signal nondissipative, since it may simply be not worthwhile for one to
mimic the others strategy given the trade-o¤ between current and future payo¤s.30
Indeed, in what follows, I will show that the current paper resolves all these issues.
In particular, a market breakdown will not happen, even though the equilibrium is
not necessarily revealing. Furthermore, if a signaling equilibrium is indeed revealing,
whether it is dissipative is completely endogenous.
2.3.1 Denition of Equilibrium
The literature, broadly speaking, has seen two branches of signaling models. The rst
involves the uninformed party moving rst, such as Spence (1974), Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976), Riley (1979), and Ofer and Thakor (1987). The second relates to the
informed party moving rst, such as Grossman and Perry (1986), Banks and Sobel
(1987), Cho (1987), and Cho and Kreps (1987). As hinted above, my model belongs
to the rst branch, as I assume that the uninformed investors o¤er the informed
entrepreneur a contract at the initiation of her project. In fact, an explicit contract
is not necessary; all that matters is that the investors can precommit to a certain
valuation of the projects technology for each particular pattern of the entrepreneurs
salary policy. One particular benet of this modeling choice is that it facilitates the
equilibrium analysis by excluding the need for o¤-equilibrium beliefs.31
We can now dene an equilibrium in our setting, which is based on Riley (1979).
Denition 2 (Riley Reactive Equilibrium) An equilibrium is a set of compensa-
tion contracts such that for any additional contract which generates an expected gain
to the deviating investor i, there exists another contract that can be made by investor
j that produces positive prots for j and negative prots for i. Moreover, there does
not exist a further contract k such that j can be made to su¤er losses.
As it is well known that the Rothschild and Stiglitz equilibrium (1976), if existent,
is the Riley reactive equilibrium. So in what follows, I will characterize the equilibria
using the Rothschild and Stiglitz notion, which is often more succinct, with strength-
ening by the Riley reactive equilibrium whenever necessary. Before proceeding with
that, let us highlight the key elements in the Rothschild and Stiglitz equilibrium.
30This is similar in spirit to the "Two-Part Wage" structure in Salop and Salop (1976).
31There is no o¤-equilibrium path.
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An equilibrium is a Rothschild and Stiglitz equilibrium if it is a pair (; ) for
each type of entrepreneurs, corresponding to a compensation contract where  is the
vector of salary rates as a fraction of the cash ow rate and  is the valuation of
technology at the time of termination, such that
(i) the entrepreneurs maximize expected utility;
(ii) no contract in the equilibrium set makes negative prots for the investors;
(iii) no contract outside the equilibrium set, if o¤ered, will make a positive prot
for the investors.
I now have three remarks. First, although termination can occur at di¤erent
points in time, recall that the terminal value is the product of a scaling factor (which
is the constant cash ow rate h divided by the valuation of technology ) and the
capital stock at the time of the termination, so the contract needs to specify only .32
Second, since the values of H and L are public knowledge,  2 [H ; L]: Third, note
that the vector of salary rates  lies in a continuum, [0; 1]1. This is an innite space,
but we can focus on one subset of it in which the salary policies are xed-rate over
time.33 That is, let t = h for every t, where  2 [0; 1] is constant. In other words,
 = (; ; :::). We can then denote the salary-valuation contract as (; ) in place of
the vector notation. Note that since the value function is continuous in the policy
variable, the value of any vector of salary rates can be replicated using a xed-rate
policy. So the investors can provide the entrepreneurs with just a xed-rate contract
rather than one with a "wild" pattern. I do acknowledge that this is still one class of
compensation policies, and I will provide suggestions on generalization in Section 4.
But for now let us turn to studying these xed-rate policies.
2.3.2 Fixed-Rate Policies
For a type i entrepreneur choosing (; ), the projects capital stock will evolve as
dKt = ((1  )h  i)Ktdt+ KtdZt; (50)
and the value for doing so is
V i = E[
Z 1
s=0
e s s(hKs + 
h

Ks)ds] (51)
where Kt follows (50). In fact, we have the following lemma.
32Think about valuation using multiples.
33While similar analysis can be applied to other subsets, the advantage of this one is that it is
fully tractable.
65
Lemma 4 For a type i entrepreneur choosing (; ), the value is
V i =
h+ h

+ + i   (1  )hK0: (52)
Proof. See Appendix.
Di¤erentiating V i with respect to  and , respectively, we observe two properties
of the value, summarized in Proposition 7.
Proposition 7 V i is strictly decreasing in  if  < h
++i h , constant in  if  =
h
++i h , and strictly increasing in  if  >
h
++i h . V
i is strictly decreasing in .
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, when the o¤ered valuation is high enough, that is, when  is low
enough, the opportunity cost of consuming now and thus lowering the amount of
capital accumulation at termination is high. So it incentivizes the entrepreneur to
substitute future payo¤ for current payo¤ by reducing the salary rate . However,
when the o¤ered valuation is low enough, that is, when  is high enough, the oppor-
tunity cost of consuming now is low, making current compensation e¤ectively more
valuable. The entrepreneur consequently would like to raise . On the other hand,
for any level of salary rate, the entrepreneur strictly prefers a lower , since it simply
gives her a higher future payo¤ than a higher  does.
Even more interestingly, the interaction between  and  reects the trade-o¤
between current payo¤and future payo¤, as indicated by the slopes of the indi¤erence
curves in the - plane, denoted by ( d
d
)i, where the subscript designates types, i.e.,
i 2 fH;Lg.34 Proposition 8 formalizes this result.
Proposition 8 ( d
d
)i > 0 if  > h++i h , (
d
d
)i = 0 if  = h++i h , and (
d
d
)i < 0 if
 < h
++i h :
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition is straightforward. The trade-o¤ between current payo¤ and future
payo¤ ultimately manifests itself in the interaction of two e¤ects: the substitution
e¤ect and the income e¤ect. When  is high enough, lowering  incentivizes the
entrepreneur to reduce salary rate as she substitutes future consumption for current
34Note that we suppress the arguments of these functions in this notation.
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Figure 3: Indi¤erence curves in the - plane. i =
h
++i h , where i 2 fH;Lg.
consumption. That is, the substitution e¤ect dominates. When  is low enough,
however, the entrepreneurs future wealth is substantial to the extent that a further
reduction in  disincentivizes her to accumulate capital. In fact, she would like to
smooth consumption by raising salary rate. In this case, the income e¤ect dominates.
Denote this critical threshold by i, i.e., let 
i
 =
h
++i h . Figure 3 depicts the
indi¤erence curves in the - plane. Let us highlight four observations. First, note
that  = i (the dash line) is one indi¤erence curve, as Proposition 8 shows. Second,
 = i divides the - plane into two regions. It is easy to verify that the lower region
(solid curves) corresponds to utility value that is strictly larger than that of  = i,
which in turn is strictly larger than that of the upper region (the dash-dot curves).
Third, the direction of increasing utility in the lower region is southwest, whereas it
is southeast in the upper region. Fourth, as discussed above, the indi¤erence curves
slope downward in the lower region and upward in the upper region.
Moreover, the fact that H < L results in crucial relations between the high
types indi¤erence curves and the low types, which will become useful later. On the
one hand, since i is decreasing in 
i, we have H > 
L
 . On the other hand, at any
point, the slope of the low types indi¤erence curve is larger than that of the high
types, which is summarized in the following lemma.
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Lemma 5 Fix any point in the - plane.
(
d
d
)i=H < (
d
d
)i=L: (53)
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, the "marginal rate of substitution" of  for reduction in  is higher
for the high type than that for the low type. The reason is that the low type is less
e¢ cient at accumulating capital, so even if she gives up some salary and gets a better
valuation in return, her capital stock cannot scale up the terminal value as e¤ectively
as the high type. In other words, the high type is more willing to give up salary (to
accumulate capital stock) for a better valuation.
2.3.3 Equilibrium Analysis
Let us rst note the relation among i, , and i, which is summarized in Lemma 6.
Lemma 6 For i 2 fH;Lg, i > i if and only if i > , and i  i if and only if
i  .
Proof. See Appendix.
Indeed, i as a function of 
i has a xed point at . That is, i(
) = .
Thus, the relative magnitude among H , L, and  results in three main cases, and
the corresponding relative magnitude among H , L, H and 
L
 leads to additional
subcases. Let us now study them.
 < H < L
In this case, neither type possesses a technology that is su¢ ciently valuable to favor
terminal over current compensation, as Proposition 6 indicates. Indeed, the rst best
strategies for both types are to consume all cash ows at each point in time. That
is, it = h, 8t, where i 2 fH;Lg. Equivalently,  = 1 is preferable for both types.
Now by Lemma 6, we know that H > H , and 
L > L . Thus, 
L > H > H > 
L
 .
Figure 4 depicts this case.
However, let us show that an equilibrium in this case cannot be pooling when
there is asymmetric information between the entrepreneurs and the investors, which
is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 9 If  < H < L, an equilibrium is never pooling.
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Figure 4: An equilibrium is never pooling if  < H < L.
Proof. The proof is similar to that in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). Figure 4 depicts
in the - plane the indi¤erence curves of the entrepreneurs, including the horizontal
 = i for i 2 fH;Lg, and the zero prot lines of the investors. Consider a pooling
contract, P . First note that P must lie on the pooling zero prot line of the investors,
ZPLP . This is due to the fact that if P is below ZPLP , then the investors o¤ering P
lose money, contracting the denition of equilibrium, and if P is above ZPLP , then
there is a contract that o¤ers slightly higher  and slightly lower  which still makes a
prot when all entrepreneurs select it. All will prefer this contract to P , so P cannot
be an equilibrium.
Since ( d
d
)i=H < (
d
d
)i=L at P , consider the contract Q, which lies to the southwest
of P , between the indi¤erence curves through P and above the zero-prot line for
the high type. Observe that the direction of increasing utility is southeast. So if Q
is o¤ered, the high type will prefer it over P , while the low type will prefer P over
it. Thus, Q attracts away only the high type, and hence makes a positive prot,
upsetting the equilibrium.
Intuitively, if a pooling contract is o¤ered here, some investors can always "skim
the cream" by o¤ering a contract in the neighborhood of the pooling contract. By
doing so, they attract away just the high type while making a positive prot. I now
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characterize an equilibrium of this case, which is a separating equilibrium, by the
following proposition.
Proposition 10 The contract that corresponds to the low types rst best and the
contract that maximizes the utility of the high type subject to that it gives the low type a
utility at most equal to that of her rst best constitute an equilibrium, if  < H < L.
Proof. Figure 5 depicts the low types indi¤erence curve L through her rst best
contract, A, as well as the zero prot lines of the investors in the - plane. As
Proposition 9 shows, if there is an equilibrium, each type must select a separate
contract. Moreover, as it is clear from the proof of Proposition 9, we see that each
contract in the equilibrium set makes zero prots. So an equilibrium contract for the
low type must be on the line ZPLL. A is most preferable (as well as feasible) along
ZPLL. Thus, A must be part of any equilibrium.
An equilibrium contract for the high type must not be more attractive to the
low type than A; it must lie on the northwest of L (including L). Clearly, of all
such contracts, the one that the high type most prefers is B, the contract at the
intersection of ZPLH and H, since otherwise one can always o¤er another contract
in the neighborhood that attracts away only the high type and thus makes a positive
prot. This establishes that the set (A;B) is the only possible equilibrium for a
market with high- and low-type entrepreneurs.35
In essence, we maximize the high types utility while ensuring that the low type
has no incentive to deviate from her rst best. This in turn pins down the contract
that the investors should o¤er to the high type.
A question of existence arises naturally. Indeed, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)
provide conditions under which (A;B) may not be an equilibrium, so that an equi-
librium does not exist (see also Hahn (1974) for a suggestive explanation for this
nonexistence). However, one can now "strengthen" the equilibrium notion using a
Riley reactive equilibrium (RRE), and it is easy to show that (A;B) is a RRE. Thus,
if  < H < L, an equilibrium exists and is unique. We can therefore refer to (A;B)
as the equilibrium.
35This somewhat heuristic argument can be made completely rigorous. See Wilson (1980).
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Figure 5: The equilibrium in the case of  < H < L
H   < L
In this case, the high-type entrepreneur has a su¢ ciently valuable technology and
she would like to compensate herself nothing until termination in absence of her
low-type counterpart. In contrast, the low-type entrepreneurs technology makes full
salary attractive if there is no high-type entrepreneur. What makes this case partic-
ularly interesting and slightly complicated is that the relative magnitude between H
and L results in two subcases, each of which includes two situations.
(1) H  L
This corresponds to the subcase where although the high types technology is
valuable, it is still not attractive yet for the low type to discard her rst best strategy.
This is shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7, as even the H valuation is still in the region
of upward-sloping indi¤erence curves for the low type, where higher salary rate is
more desirable. These two gures correspond to the two situations, which we now
discuss in turn.
First, we have L  H < L < H . In this situation, since the investors know
the values of H and L, the relevant valuation  belongs to [H ; L]. The indi¤erence
curves of the high type and the low type have opposite signs in this region. Then
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Figure 6: The equilibrium in the case of L  H < L < H
Figure 7: The equilibrium in the case of L  H < H  L
72
it is clear that an equilibrium cannot be pooling, since some investors can always
"cherry-pick" the high type in the neighborhood of the pooling contract, making a
positive prot.
We now show the unique equilibrium is the set (A;B) in Figure 6, by the next
proposition.
Proposition 11 The contracts that correspond to the low types rst best and the
high types rst best constitute the unique equilibrium, if L  H < L < H .
Proof. Figure 6 depicts both types indi¤erence curves, L and H, through their
respective rst best contracts, A and B, as well as the zero prot lines of the investors
in the - plane. We know that if there is an equilibrium, it is separating, and since
each contract in the equilibrium set makes zero prots, the equilibrium contracts
must be on the zero prot lines, ZPLL and ZPLH , respectively.
Now, along ZPLL and ZPLH , A and B maximize respectively the low types
utility and the high types utility. Thus, (A;B) satises the rst two requirements in
the denition of an equilibrium. Moreover, any contract that is preferable to A for the
low type is to the southeast of A, which is either unfeasible or makes a negative prot
(since it attracts only the low type); any contract that is preferable to B for the high
type is to the southwest of B, which simply is not feasible. So the third requirement
in the equilibrium denition is also fullled. Thus, (A;B) is an equilibrium.
Finally, Proposition 6 shows that the solution to the optimization problem for
either type is unique. Therefore, (A;B) is the unique equilibrium.
The second situation is when L  H < H  L. Similar to the rst situation,
an equilibrium in this situation is never pooling. One slight variation is that although
the indi¤erence curves of the low type in the relevant range is everywhere upward-
sloping, the indi¤erence curves of the high type can be upward-sloping, at, as well
as downward-sloping. However, recall that a downward-sloping indi¤erence curve
corresponds to a higher utility level than that of the at one, which in turn is higher
than that of a upward-sloping one. So no matter where the pooling contract is,36 some
investors can always o¤er a contract in the region of downward-sloping indi¤erence
curves that is attractive only to the high type.
In addition, applying the same argument in the proof of Proposition 11, one can
establish that the set (A;B) is the unique equilibrium in Figure 7. Therefore, as long
36It has to belong to (H ; L) though, since  2 (0; 1).
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Figure 8: The equilibrium in the case of H < L < 
L < H
as H   < L and H  L , the contracts that correspond to the "rst bests" of
the two types constitute the unique separating equilibrium.
(2) H < L
This corresponds to the subcase where the high types technology is so valuable
that it is attractive for the low type to mimic even if the low type has to forgo her
rst best strategy. As Figure 8 and Figure 9 show, the H valuation belongs to the
region of downward-sloping indi¤erence curves for the low type. That is, if the low
type can obtain a valuation close to H , she is incentivized to postpone payo¤ until
the time of termination. We again have two situations.
First, we have H < L < 
L < H . This is shown in Figure 8. Note that while
the indi¤erence curves of the high type in the relevant range [H ; L] is everywhere
downward-sloping, the indi¤erence curves of the low type can be upward-sloping, at,
as well as downward-sloping. In contrast to the cases above where an equilibrium
cannot be pooling, we show in the current situation that an equilibrium cannot be
separating, which is formalized in the next proposition.
Proposition 12 If H < L < 
L < H , an equilibrium is never separating.
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Figure 9: The equilibrium in the case of H < L < 
H
  L
Proof. The proof is almost immediate. If an equilibrium is separating, then since
each contract in the equilibrium set makes zero prots, the equilibrium contract for
the low type must be on ZPLL and that for the high type must be on ZPLH . But we
know any indi¤erence curve of the low type crossing ZPLL corresponds to a utility
level that is lower than that of any indi¤erence curve of the low type crossing ZPLH ,
as in Figure 8. Thus, if any contract along ZPLH is o¤ered, despite that it is intended
for the high type, the low type will select it as well. But then the investors will make
a negative prot, upsetting the equilibrium.
In essence, when the high types technology is substantially valuable, the low type
does not mind altering her optimal course of actions since the terminal payo¤ at a
valuation near the high types will more than compensate for the reduction in current
pay. Indeed, mimicking the high type becomes her top priority. We now show that
there exists a unique pooling equilibrium, by the following proposition.
Proposition 13 The pooling contract that corresponds to the weighted average pool-
ing valuation using  and the high types rst best choice of salary rate is the unique
equilibrium if H < L < 
L < H .
Proof. Depending on the magnitude of , the proportion of the high type, the
weighted average pooling valuation can fall into either of the two ranges, (H ; L ] or
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(L ; 
L). The pooling zero prot line ZPLP in Figure 8 depicts the former range.
First, it is obvious that if the contract P is o¤ered and selected by both types, the
investors makes zero prots. Second, any contract that is preferable than P to the low
type and the high type lies to the southwest of the solid curves L and H, respectively.
Given feasibility, these correspond to the regions enclosed by the vertical line  = 0,
ZPLH , and L or H, respectively. Then, if a contract between L and H is o¤ered, it
attracts only the low type and clearly makes a negative prot. If a contract to the
southwest of H is o¤ered, it attracts both types but it still makes a negative prot
since it is below ZPLP . Finally, among the pooling contracts on ZPLP , P maximizes
both typesutility.
The pooling zero prot line ZPLP 0 illustrates the latter case, which is slightly
more complicated. Here a pooling valuation does not motivate the low type to choose
zero salary rate (indeed, she prefers full salary). However, we claim that the equi-
librium is still a pooling contract where both types compensate themselves nothing
until the time of termination, which corresponds to the point P 0. First, since the
equilibrium cannot be separating, it must lie on ZPLP 0 by the argument in the proof
of Proposition 9. Along ZPLP 0 , P 0 is the unique contract where the investors cannot
"cherry-pick" by o¤ering a contract in the neighborhood that attracts only the high
type while making a positive prot. Indeed, any contract that is preferable to P 0
lies in the region between the solid curve H 0 and the line  = 0. But any such o¤er
attracts both types and since it is below ZPLP 0 , who o¤ers it will make a negative
prot. Thus, no investor will make such an o¤er. Moreover, any other o¤er that is to
the southeast of L0 as well as to the northeast of H 0 attracts only the low type and
thus makes a negative prot. So no investor will make an o¤er in this region either.
Therefore, P 0 is the only equilibrium when the weighted average pooling valuation is
in (L ; 
L].
It may seem counter-intuitive at rst that the low type does worse than her rst
best when the weighted average pooling valuation is in the range (L ; 
L]. After all,
why does not she just reveal the truth to the investors that she is the low type and
then require the full salary rate? The problem is that this revelation is not credible.
Suppose the investors o¤er two contracts ( = 1; L) and ( = 0; H), intended
respectively, to the low type and the high type. But once these two contracts are
o¤ered, all entrepreneurs will select ( = 0; H). That is, the low type cannot credibly
commit to ( = 1; L), and the investors know this. Therefore, they will only o¤er
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the pooling contract.
The second situation is when H < L < 
H
  L. Similar to the rst situation,
an equilibrium in this situation is never separating. Also, it is almost parallel to show
that the pooling contract that corresponds to the weighted average pooling valuation
and the high types rst best choice of salary rate is the unique equilibrium. The
only di¤erence is that there are now three ranges that the weighted average pooling
valuation can fall into, (H ; L ], (
L
 ; 
H
 ], and (
H
 ; 
L). We have established the
equilibrium corresponding to the rst two ranges and we now show the equilibrium
associated with the third.
As Figure 9 indicates, the contract Q attracts both types and since it is above the
pooling zero prot line ZPLP , it also makes a positive prot for those investors who
o¤er this. We now apply the stronger Riley Reactive Equilibrium concept and it is
easy to show that P is a RRE. Indeed, if Q is o¤ered by a group of investors, then
another group of investors can o¤er a contract that is to the southwest of Q; between
the dotted H and L, as well as above ZPLH . This newly o¤ered contract attracts
the high type but not the low type. Moreover, the investors who o¤er this contract
cannot be made to su¤er losses, since they already have only the high type (the worst
for them is to break even). Applying this argument iteratively to any contract that is
a protable deviation from P and noticing that this "cherry-picking" just described
is not available at P since any contract that is to the southwest of P and between
the solid H and L is not feasible, we establish that P is the unique equilibrium.
H < L  
In this case, by Proposition 6, either type possesses a technology that is su¢ -
ciently valuable to motivate the entrepreneur to compensate herself nothing until
termination, when there is symmetric information between the entrepreneurs and the
investors. Now Lemma 6 implies that H < H , and 
L  L . Thus, H > L 
L > H . Figure 10 depicts this case.
It is simple to show that P is the unique equilibrium since any deviating contract
that is preferable to either type will make a negative prot for the investor o¤ering it.
This is due to the fact that "cherry-picking" requires a contract that is outside the
feasible region. Intuitively, the technology of either type is so valuable that following
the optimal course of actions of full investment dominates the issue of mimicking.
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Figure 10: The equilibrium in the case of H < L  
Summary Summarizing the results above, we obtain the main theorem of the pa-
per.
Theorem 6 Depending on the parameter values, we have one of the following:
(i) If  < H < L, a unique separating equilibrium exists where the low type
obtains her rst best of full salary rate while the high type does not.
(ii) If H   < L, a unique separating equilibrium exists where both types obtain
their respective rst bests when H  L ; a unique pooling equilibrium exists where
both types follow the high types rst best of full investment rate when H < L .
(iii) If H < L  , a unique pooling equilibrium exists where both types follow
full investment.
When both types technologies are less valuable than the rst best threshold,
we have a separating equilibrium that is fully revealing. The low type achieves her
rst best by paying herself all the cash ows at each point in time. The high type,
however, takes a cut in salary rate in return for being valued at her technologys true
worth. She is willing to do so because she is more e¢ cient at accumulating capital
than the low type, so reducing salary rate has the added benet of increasing (more
e¤ectively than the low type) the capital stock which scales up the terminal payo¤.
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Nevertheless, having a salary rate that is lower than her rst best is still costly to the
high type. So the signal is dissipative.
When the low types technology is less valuable than the rst best threshold while
the high types is more valuable than it and yet it is not too much more valuable than
the low types, we again have a fully revealing separating equilibrium. Interestingly,
however, both types follow their respective rst best compensation policies. In this
case, it is better for the low type to stick to her optimal course of actions under
symmetric information given her specic trade-o¤ between current payo¤ and future
payo¤. As a result, the signal serves to self-select and is therefore nondissipative.
When the low types technology is less valuable than the rst best threshold while
the high types is more valuable than it and it is also too more valuable than the low
types, we have a pooling equilibrium. The two types pool at the high types rst best
compensation policy since the high types valuation is so high that the low type would
like to mimic no matter what. The low type may or may not do better overall than
her rst best total payo¤ under symmetric information. When she does do worse,
it is due to her lack of credible commitment to her rst best compensation policy
and the natural boundedness of her feasible actions. The investors being aware of
this can thus force a pooling result, where neither market breakdown nor information
revelation occurs.
Finally, when both typestechnologies are more valuable than the rst best thresh-
old, we also have a pooling equilibrium. Both types opt for full investment. This is
due to the fact that the technologies are so valuable that following the optimal course
of actions for capital accumulation is ones top priority.
2.4 Model Extensions and Empirical Predictions
2.4.1 Model Extensions
We have considered one class (although a continuum) of contracts where the salary
policies are xed-rate over time. More generally, we can solve for optimal contract by
maximizing the high types utility subject to the low types incentive compatibility
constraint as well as the capital stock processes and nonnegativity. That is, we can
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max
ftg
E[
Z 1
s=0
e s s(sK
H
s + 
h
H
KHs )ds]
s:t: E[
Z 1
s=0
e s s(sK
L
s + 
h
H
KLs )ds]  V L(K0)
dKHt = (h  t   H)KHt dt+ KHt dZt
dKLt = (h  t   L)KLt dt+ KLt dZt
0  t  h
KHt  0
KLt  0;
where V L(K0) =
 h
L
++L hK0, if 
L 
p
(+ h)2+4h (+ h)
2
, and V L(K0) =
 h
L
+h
++L
K0,
if L >
p
(+ h)2+4h (+ h)
2
.
Obviously, this problem is more complicated to solve than the setting where the
salary policies are xed-rate. However, it may be tractable given that we can still
utilize homogeneity.37
2.4.2 Empirical Predictions
The main empirical predictions of the model are summarized here. The focus is on
the obsolescence rate , which captures the growth prospects of the project as a result
of the entrepreneur. In other words, it reects how relevant the entrepreneur is to
the production process of the project.
A key proxy for entrepreneur relevance is the nature of the industry. Specically,
industries such as the fast food industry do not appear to require much hands-on
entrepreneur expertise, and it is fairly standardized across rms. On the other hand,
industries such as the software development industry typically require a lot of human
capital input from the entrepreneurs, and this is likely the case for every single rm.
In between perhaps these two extremes are industries such as the service industry, for
instance nursing homes, where the relevance of the entrepreneurial input is drastically
heterogeneous. It is sometimes the entrepreneurs insight that determines the fate of
the venture, whereas in other cases it is the general business environment (industry
trend, etc.) that really matters.
37That is, dividing both the objective and the constraints by K0, we can again apply the solution
strategy in Section 2.
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Therefore, cross-sectionally, we predict that
 In industries that the relevance of entrepreneurial inputs is homogeneously low,
entrepreneurs in better performing rms take lower cash-based pay.
 In industries that the relevance of entrepreneurial inputs is homogeneously high,
entrepreneurs in all rms take low levels cash-based pay.
 In industries that the relevance of entrepreneurial inputs is heterogeneous, en-
trepreneurs in better performing rms take lower cash-based pay.
It is often the case that the relevance of entrepreneurial inputs is high among
high-tech industries. Therefore, all in all, we expect the across-rm variation in cash-
versus-equity pay to be more pronounced in low-tech industries than in high-tech
industries.
2.5 Conclusion
Prior literature has documented yet not explained the tremendous cross-sectional
variation in entrepreneurial compensation. The uniqueness of small businesses, in
particular the di¤erence between entrepreneurs and corporate managers, makes the
insights from the executive compensation studies on risk and incentives remote for
this issue. Instead, an asymmetric-information perspective seems more relevant given
the signicant information advantage that entrepreneurs possess over the investors.
This paper employs such a perspective considering the reliance of the uninformed
investors on compensation structure as a signal to distinguish among di¤erent types
of informed entrepreneurs. Furthermore, an interesting trade-o¤ between current
and future payo¤s is modeled, where an entrepreneur balances her salary drawn from
developing a project with its terminal payo¤. This terminal payo¤ is e¤ectively her
deferred compensation as she makes reinvestment into the project.
The signaling model with this embedded intertemporal trade-o¤has some interest-
ing features. In particular, a market breakdown will not occur, with both separating
and pooling equilibria possible, and consequently, an equilibrium is not necessarily
informationally consistent. Furthermore, when an equilibrium is indeed revealing,
whether the signal is dissipative is completely endogenous.
These features correspond naturally to empirical predictions about entrepreneurial
compensation. The model focuses on how relevant entrepreneurial inputs are to
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the production process, which reects the intrinsic interest of the investors on the
growth prospects. A key proxy for entrepreneurial relevance is the nature of the
industry. Therefore, the study may explain some of the cross-industry di¤erential
in compensation structure, in particular between equity-based and cash-based pay.
Indeed, future research can be designed to directly test these implications.
References
[1] Ang, J. S., 1991. Small Business Uniqueness and the Theory of Financial Man-
agement. Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance 1: 1-13.
[2] Akerlof, G. A., 1970. The market for "lemons": quality uncertainty and the market
mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics 84: 488-500.
[3] Albuquerue, R. and N. Wang, 2008. Agency conicts, investment, and asset pric-
ing. Journal of Finance 63: 140.
[4] Banks, J. and J. Sobel, 1987. Equilibrium selection in signaling games. Econo-
metrica 55: 647-661.
[5] Bhattacharya, S, 1980. Nondissipative Signaling Structures and Dividend Policy.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 95: 1-24.
[6] Blanchower, D. G. and A. J. Oswald, 1998. What makes an entrepreneur? Jour-
nal of Labor Economics 16: 2660.
[7] Brennan M., and A. Kraus, 1987. E¢ cient Financing Under Asymmetric Infor-
mation. Journal of Finance 42: 1225-1243.
[8] Cho, I., 1987. A renement of sequential equilibrium. Econometrica 55: 1367-
1389.
[9] Cho, I. and D. M. Kreps, 1987. Signaling games and stable equilibria. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 102: 179-222.
[10] Cox, J. C., J. E. Ingersoll, Jr., and S. A. Ross, 1985. An intertemporal general
equilibrium model of asset prices. Econometrica 53: 363384.
82
[11] Cramer, J. S., J. Hartog, N. Jonker, and C. M. Van Praag, 2002. Low risk
aversion encourages the choice for entrepreneurship: an empirical test of a truism.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 48: 2936.
[12] Franke, G., 1987. Costless Signalling in Financial Markets. Journal of Finance
42: 809-822.
[13] Gordon, M. J., 1959. Dividends, earnings and stock prices. Review of Economics
and Statistics 41: 99105.
[14] Greenwood, J., Z. Hercowitz, and G. W. Hu¤man, 1988. Investment, capacity
utilization and the real business cycle. American Economic Review 78: 402417.
[15] Greenwood, J., Z. Hercowitz, and P. Krusell, 1997. The role of investment-specic
technological change in the business cycle. European Economic Review 44: 91115.
[16] Greenwood, J., Z. Hercowitz, and P. Krusell, 2000. Long-run implications of
investment-specic technological change. American Economic Review 87: 342362.
[17] Grossman, S. J. and M. Perry, 1986. Perfect sequential equilibrium. Journal of
Economic Theory 39: 97119.
[18] Hahn, F. H., 1974. Notes on R-S models of insurance markets. Mimeo, Cambridge
University.
[19] Heinkel, R., 1982. A Theory of Capital Structure Relevance under Imperfect
Information. Journal of Finance 37: 1141-1150.
[20] Holmstrom, B., 1979. Moral hazard and observability. Bell Journal of Economics
10: 74-91.
[21] Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling, 1976. Theory of the investor: managerial
behaviour, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics
3: 305-360.
[22] Kanbur, S. M., 1979. On risk taking and the personal distribution of income.
Journal of Political Economy 87: 760797.
[23] Leland, H. E. and D. H. Pyle, 1977. Informational asymmetries, nancial struc-
ture, and nancial intermediation. Journal of Finance 32: 371387.
83
[24] Ofer, A. and A. V. Thakor, 1987. A theory of corporate cash disbursement
mechanisms: stock repurchases and dividends. Journal of Finance 42: 365-394.
[25] Prendergast, C., 1999. The provision of incentives in investors. Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature 37: 763.
[26] Prendergast, C., 2002. The tenuous trade-o¤between risk and incentives. Journal
of Political Economy 110: 1071-1102.
[27] Riley, J. G., 1979. Informational equilibrium. Econometrica 47: 331-359.
[28] Rothschild, M. and J. Stiglitz, 1976. Equilibrium in competitive insurance mar-
kets: an essay on the economics of imperfect information. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 90: 629-649.
[29] Salop, J. and S. Salop, 1976. Self-selection and turnover in the labor market.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 90: 619-627.
[30] Spence, M., 1974. Competitive and optimal responses to signals: an analysis of
e¢ ciency and distribution. Journal of Economic Theory 7: 296-332.
[31] Stanford Graduate School of Business, 2012. Search Funds-2011: Selected Ob-
servations.
[32] Sundaresan, S. M., 1984. Consumption and equilibrium interest rates in stochas-
tic production economies. Journal of Finance 39: 7792.
[33] Wasserman, N., 2004. Executive Compensation in Entrepreneurial Teams: The
Founder Gap, Board membership, and Pay for Milestones. Academy of Manage-
ment Annual Meeting Paper Proceedings.
[34] Wilson, C. A., 1980. The nature of equilibrium in markets with adverse selection.
Bell Journal of Economics 11: 108-30.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3. From (45), we know the capital stock process follows a
geometric Brownian motion, which implies that
Kt = K exp[( i   1
2
2)(t  ) + (Zt   Z )];
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for t  
Thus, from (46), interchanging the order of integration, and using the property of
log-normal distribution, we have
E [
Z 1
t=
hKtdt] =
Z 1
t=
E [hKt]dt]
= h
Z 1
t=
EfK exp[( i   1
2
2)(t  ) + (Zt   Z )]gdt
= hK
Z 1
t=
exp[( i)(t  )]dt
=
h
i
K
Proof of Proposition 6. Dene the process
Mt 
Z t
s=0
e s s(sKs + 
h
i
Ks)ds+ e
 t tV (Kt): (A1)
Applying Itos lemma and basic calculus, we have from (44) and (49) that
E[dMt]
e t tdt
= tKt + 
h
i
Kt   (+ )CKt + C(h  t   i)Kt (A2)
If we have the correct value function and the optimal strategy, Mt is the condi-
tional expectation of the value and a martingale. If we have a suboptimal strategy,
however, then this is a supermartingale, since the value will fall on average reecting
the shortfall from potential. Thus, if have the right value function, the drift of Mt
is maximized at 0 by the optimal controls.38 Thus, from (A2), we have the Bellman
equation

h
i
K   (+ )CK + max

[K + C(h     i)K] = 0; (A3)
which upon simplifying becomes

h
i
  (+ )C + max

[ + C(h     i)] = 0: (A4)
Since the objective is linear in  and 0    h, (A4) is equivalent to

h
i
  (+ )C + max

f(h  i)C; h  iCg = 0; (A5)
38Since a margingale has zero drift and a supermartingale has zero or negative drift.
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where the rst component in the max function is obtained when  = 0 while the
second is obtained when  = h.
Dene the function
f(C)   h
i
  (+ )C + max

f(h  i)C; h  iCg;
and recognizing that
(h  i)C  h  iC , C  1;
we have
f(C) =

 h
i
  (+ + i   h)C if C  1
 h
i
  (+ + i)C + h if C < 1

:
Note that
f(1) = 
h
i
  (+ + i   h):
Thus, letting C be such that f(C) = 0, we have that if  h
i
 ++ i h, i.e.,
i 
p
(+ h)2+4h (+ h)
2
,39 then  h
i
  (+ + i   h)C = 0, which implies that
C =
 h
i
+ + i   h;
which is indeed greater than or equal to 1. So this corresponds to the optimal strategy
that  = 0.
In contrast, if  h
i
<  +  + i   h, i.e., i >
p
(+ h)2+4h (+ h)
2
, then  h
i
 
(+ + i)C + h = 0, which implies that
C =
 h
i
+ h
+ + i
;
which is indeed smaller than 1. In this case, the optimal strategy is that  = h.
Proof of Lemma 4. From (50), we know that the capital stock process follows a
geometric Brownian motion, which implies that
Kt = K0 expf[(1  )h  i   1
2
2]t+ Ztg: (A6)
39This is because  +    h > 0 (otherwise, the capital process will explode if the obsolescence
rate is not large enough) and i > 0 (so the negative root is not relevant).
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Thus, from (51), interchanging the order of integration, and using the property of
log-normal distribution, we have
V i =
Z 1
s=0
E[e s s(hKs + 
h

Ks)ds] (A7)
=
Z 1
s=0
e s s[h+ 
h

]E(K0 expf[(1  )h  i   1
2
2]s+ Zsg)ds
=
Z 1
s=0
e s s[h+ 
h

]K0 expf[(1  )h  i]sgds
= [h+ 
h

]K0
Z 1
s=0
expf[ (+ + i) + (1  )h]sgds
= K0[h+ 
h

]
Z 1
s=0
exp( Ais)ds;
where Ai = + + i   (1  )h. Obviously, Ai > 0 since +   h > 0. Then (A7)
implies that
V i =
h+ h

Ai
K0;
that is,
V i =
h+ h

+ + i   (1  )hK0:
Proof of Proposition 7. Di¤erentiating V i with respect to , we have
@V i
@
=
hK0(+ + 
i   h+ h)  h(h+ h

)K0
(+ + i   h+ h)2
=
K0h(+ + 
i   h  h

)
(+ + i   h+ h)2 :
Since K0 > 0 and h > 0, we have @V
i
@
> 0 if and only if  +  + i   h   h

> 0,
which corresponds to
 >
h
+ + i   h:
Similarly, @V
i
@
= 0 if and only if
 =
h
+ + i   h;
and @V
i
@
< 0 if and only if
 <
h
+ + i   h:
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Now di¤erentiating V i with respect to , we have
@V i
@
=   K0h
(+ + i   h+ h)2 < 0;
since K0 > 0,  > 0, h > 0, and + + 
i   (1  )h > 0.
Proof of Proposition 8. Calculating the slopes of the indi¤erence curves in the
- plane, we have
(
d
d
)i =  
@V i
@
@V i
@
=  
K0h(++
i h h

)
(++i h+h)2
[  K0h
(++i h+h)2 ]
=
2(+ + i   h  h

)
(+ + i   h+ h) :
Thus, d
d
> 0 if and only if + + i   h  h

> 0, or
 >
h
+ + i   h:
Similarly, d
d
= 0 if and only if
 =
h
+ + i   h;
and d
d
< 0 if and only if
 <
h
+ + i   h:
Proof of Lemma 5. From the proof of Proposition 8, we know that
(
d
d
)i =
2(+ + i   h  h

)
(+ + i   h+ h) :
Now di¤erentiate ( d
d
)i with respect to the parameter 
i,
@( d
d
)i
@i
=
2(+ + i   h+ h)  2(+ + i   h  h

)
[(+ + i   h+ h)]2
=
2(h+ h

)
[(+ + i   h+ h)]2 ;
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which is positive, since , h, and  are all positive, and  2 [0; 1].
Thus, H < L implies that
(
d
d
)i=H < (
d
d
)i=L:
Proof of Lemma 6. Consider any i 2 fH;Lg.
i > i =
h
+ + i   h
if and only if (recall + + i   h > 0)
i(+ + i   h) > h;
which is true if and only if
(i)2 + (+   h)i   h > 0: (A8)
But (A8) holds if and only if40
i >
p
(+   h)2 + 4h  (+   h)
2
= :
Similarly, i  i if and only if i  .
40The negative root is not relevant.
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3 Surrender Risk in Life Insurance Policies
3.1 Introduction
Many nancial securities in the xed income market have embedded option features.
The classical example is perhaps a callable bond, which allows the issuer of the bond
a right to redeem the bond at some point before maturity. Another example is
mortgage-backed securities (MBS), which often embed a prepayment option, where
homeowners can pay o¤ the mortgage loans early to take advantage of possibly lower
interest payments through renancing. These options, albeit implicit in the contracts,
explicitly impact the associated cash ows. As a result, understanding such option-
ality is fundamentally important in pricing and trading such nancial instruments.
Indeed, these embedded option features have attracted enormous attention from
academics and practitioners alike. For instance, the seminal work of Brennan and
Schwartz (1977) provides a pricing framework to value callable bonds, while subse-
quently Dunetz and Mahoney (1988) and Longsta¤ (1992), among others, address
many practical and empirical concerns. Similarly, mortgage prepayment option is
heavily studied, and a very selective list includes Dunn and McConnell (1981), Green
and Shoven (1986), Schwartz and Torous (1989), Kang and Zenios (1992), Stanton
(1995), LeRoy (1996), and Kalotay et al. (2004).
Some life insurance related instruments also encapsulate salient option features.41
In particular, cash-value life insurance, such as a whole life insurance policy, embeds a
surrender option that gives the policy holder a right to exchange an existing contract
for its cash surrender value any time during the life of the contract. In other words,
a surrender option is an American-style put option that entitles its owner (the policy
holder) to sell back the contract to the issuer (the insurer) at the cash surrender
value. Just as the prepayment option imposes a cash-ow risk to MBS investors, this
surrender option is a source of concern for life insurers. Specically, the cash surrender
value provides e¤ectively an interest rate guarantee to policy holders. So in theory,
when interest rates go up, policy holders may surrender their existing policies to buy
new contracts o¤ering higher yields, negatively impacting the insurers. Therefore, it
is critical to appreciate this surrender risk by studying the optionality intrinsic to the
surrender right.
41Indeed, as early as the 1980s, Smith (1982) and Walden (1985) argue that life insurance contracts
can be considered as option packages.
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Prior research, albeit limited, has explored this issue mainly from a theoretical
perspective. Albizzati and Geman (1994) rst price the surrender option by con-
sidering it as a package of European options and applying a Black-Scholes (1973)
type of technique with a Heath-Jarrow-Morton (1992) model of interest rate dynam-
ics. Grosen and Jorgensen (1997, 2000) rst consider the full American feature of
the option by valuing the surrender right as an early exercisable interest rate guar-
antee and utilizing developments on American option pricing theory (e.g., Johnson
(1983), Karatzas (1988), Kim (1990), Carr et al. (1992), Jamshidian (1992), and
Myneni (1992)). Bacinello (2003) also prices the American-style option by employing
a recursive binomial formula patterned after the Cox et al. (1979) discrete option
pricing model, and so do Tanskanen and Lukkarinen (2003) by extending Grosen and
Jorgensen (2000).
What most of these studies share in common is the theoretical assumption of
fully rational response of policy holders to interest rates. In particular, given the
American feature, the premise is that exercising the option or surrendering occur at
an optimal stopping time. However, in reality, whether to surrender an existing policy
is a multi-faceted decision, often characterized by irrationality from policy holders
(See e.g., LIMRA International (2011)). Analogously, interest rates are only one
of the multiple factors that drive the mortgage prepayment decision (See Veronesi
(2010), for instance). Indeed, ever since Schwartz and Torous (1989)s pioneering
work in integrating an empirically estimated prepayment function into the valuation
framework, it has become common practice among nancial institutions to rely on
empirics to price MBS. Nevertheless, such integration appears absent in the arena of
life insurance.
This paper lls this gap in the literature by incorporating an empirical surrender
function to price the surrender option embedded in life insurance policies. I rst
model surrendering econometrically, asking what factors drive actual surrender ac-
tivity. I then construct an interest rate binomial tree and apply a recursive technique
for option pricing. This procedure allows me to price the surrender option under both
the assumption of full rationality and the consideration of the empirically estimated
surrender function, examining how the option prices compare between the two frame-
works. Finally, I analyze some comparative statics, exploring how the option prices
behave in di¤erent interest rate and industry environments.
Although this is to my knowledge the rst paper to integrate empirics into the
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valuation of surrender options, there are some previous studies that investigate em-
pirically the surrender activity. Two competing hypotheses have been proposed. One
is the so called "Emergency Fund Hypothesis" which actually dates all the way back
to Linton (1932), suggesting that surrender activity should increase during periods
of economic duress. The other is the so called "Interest Rate Hypothesis" emerging
from a New York Life (1986) survey of surrendering policy holders which sees a com-
mon reason for surrendering from respondents as a better value on another insurance
policy due to higher yield.
However, evidence on this debate is mixed. Dar and Dodds (1989) use UK ag-
gregate data from 1952 through 1985 and nd a positive relation between surrender
activity and unemployment, but no such relationship with interest rates. Outreville
(1990) employs North American macro data for the period of 1955 to 1979, and nds
that unemployment has a signicantly positive e¤ect while income has a signicantly
negative e¤ect, but again no signicant relationship with interest rates. Nevertheless,
more recently, Russell et al. (2013) exploits state-level variation from 1995 through
2009 in the US and nd that interest rate variables are signicantly positively related
to policy surrender, while there is a negative relation between real per capita income
and surrender activity, yet counter-intuitively, policy surrender seems to decrease
with unemployment.
This paper, on the other hand, provides unifying evidence on both hypotheses.
Indeed, I nd policy surrender is signicantly positively associated with interest rates,
supporting the Interest Rate Hypothesis. I also nd that policy surrender is signi-
cantly positively related to unemployment but negatively related to income, support-
ing the Emergency Fund Hypothesis.
The data that I utilize come from a large industry experience study in the US
spanning 2001 to 2010. An improvement of these data compared to prior country-
or state-level data is the consideration for policy vintages. In other words, while
country- or state-level data have to lump together policies originated in di¤erent
years to calculate a surrender rate for this year, our industry experience data can
track these policies with di¤erent vintages over time, making each surrender rate
specic to one particular year of origination. This feature of the data allows me
to discover another factor greatly impacting surrender activity, policy vintage, that
previous studies cannot capture. Indeed, I nd, for the rst time, that the rst policy
year has a signicantly positive impact on surrender, and its economic magnitude is
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even higher than these other factors. Moreover, with this additional factor, the paper
is able to explain more than 80% of the variation in the surrender activity.
Using these empirics, I calculate and compare the value of the surrender option
under full rationality with that based on actual surrender experience. I nd that the
experience-based option value is substantially lower than its fully rational counter-
part. This reects suboptimality in actual surrender activity. Moreover, while the
fully rational option value is always positive, the experience-based option value can
sometimes be negative, in which case it indicates that life insurers can make a prot
from the option exercising even though they are the writers of the option.
Finally, the competitive landscape of the life insurance industry and the interest
rate environment both have prominent impact on the value of the surrender option. A
less competitive market allows the insurers a greater margin on their products, which
reduces the cash ows to the policy holders upon surrendering the policy and hence
results in a lower option value, which this paper illustrates. Higher interest rates,
however, e¤ectively increase the moneyness of the option, raising its value, which is
also conrmed in my ndings.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2, I provide some information about
the life insurance market, detailing the di¤erent types of insurance policies and point-
ing out the focus of this paper. Section 3.3 introduces the various components of the
policies that are relevant for the surrender option and highlights the interest rate
binomial model that is the centerpiece of the pricing apparatus. In Section 3.4, I
discuss the data and the key parameters, illustrate the ow of the methodology, and
present the results. Section 3.5 concludes. All tables and gures are in the Appendix.
3.2 Life Insurance Market
The primary reason that people buy life insurance is to protect their dependents
against nancial hardship when the insured person (the policy holder) dies. Many
life insurance products also allow policy holders to accumulate savings that can be
used at a later time. This economic protection appears attractive to most American
families, as 70% own some type of life insurance (LIMRA International 2011).
Indeed, the sheer volume of life insurance policies makes it a vast market. Ameri-
cans purchased $2.8 trillion of new life insurance coverage in 2013, and by the end of
the year, total life insurance coverage in the U.S. was $19.7 trillion (American Council
of Life Insurers (2014)). To put this in perspective, issuance of all mortgage-related
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securities totaled $1.97 trillion in 2013, with $8.72 trillion outstanding at year end
(Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (2014)), which is already huge
compared to mere $55 billion for the same year in the US IPO market (Renaissance
Capital (2014)).42
There are three major types of life insurance policies. First is individual insurance,
which is underwritten separately for each individual who seeks insurance protection.
Second, group insurance is underwritten on a group as a whole, such as the employees
of a company or the members of an organization. Third, credit insurance guarantees
payment of some debt, such as a mortgage, in the event the insured person dies, and
can be bought on either an individual or a group basis.
Individual life is by far the most widely used form of life insurance protection,
accounting for 58 percent of all life insurance in force in the U.S. at year-end 2013
(American Council of Life Insurers (2014)).43 Individual life policies o¤er two basic
types of protection: covering a specied term, or permanently covering ones whole
life. The term insurance policies provide life insurance coverage for a xed period, but
no further benets when the term expires or build-up of cash value, and therefore,
the issue of surrendering is typically irrelevant for term insurance. Permanent life
insurance, however, provides protection for as long as the insured lives. In addition,
permanent life policies accumulate cash value that a policy holder can exchange for the
policys death benet (the next section will illustrate this surrender feature further).
There are four types of permanent life insurance policies: whole life (WL), univer-
sal life (UL), variable life (VL), and variable-universal life (VUL). Table 1 presents
the main di¤erences. The premium of WL policies is xed and the insurer guarantees
a xed death benet since it is the insurer who makes the investment choice using the
insurance premium. The insurer also makes the investment choice providing a xed
benet with UL, but allows a exible premium payment schedule. In contrast, for
VL, the benet and cash value vary subject to the performance of a portfolio of in-
vestments chosen by the policy holder (a stock index, for instance), and nally, VUL
combines the exible premium payment options of UL with the varied investment
options of VL.
The surrender risk is more relevant in WL and UL policies, since it is the insurers
422013 was in fact the best year for US IPO market in over a decade, with a total of 222 companies
gone public.
43It has also grown steadily, from a total coverage of $9.7 trillion in 2003 to that of $11.4 trillion
in 2013, averaging an annual rate of 1.6 percent.
94
who bear the risk of nancial market uctuation when they guarantee the benets
to the policy holders. Between WL and UL, WL policies are more popular44 and the
xed-premium structure simplies the analysis. Therefore, I focus on WL policies in
the subsequent sections of this study.
3.3 Pricing Model
3.3.1 Formulation
Whole life insurance policies provide policy holders with death benets. Denote the
face amount of this death benet by F . Assume that the insurance premium is paid
lump-sum at the inception of the contract.
Consider an age-gender prole c = (a; g), where a is the age at which the policy
holder rst purchases the whole life insurance policy. The most common value is
a = 35 and g = male, which will be the case in this paper. Then let t denote passage
of time (in years) relative to a, i.e., since the inception of the contract. Denote by
c(t) the probability that the insured with prole c dies between times t   1 and t
conditional on that the policy holder has survived until time t  1. This probability
is provided in a standard mortality table. In Section 3.4, the 2001 Commissioners
Standard Ordinary (CSO) Mortality Table is used, which is the current industry
standard (American Council of Life Insurers (2014))).
The cash surrender value of this policy at time s (again relative to when the policy
holder is at age a, similarly henceforth), U c(s), is the sum of the present expected
value of future benets where the discounting uses f , a xed annual interest rate set
by regulation (Towers Watson (2014)). That is,
U c(s) = F
T s+1P
t=1
fc(s+ t)
s+t 1Q
i=1
[1  c(i)]g exp( ft); (54)
where T is the di¤erence between the terminal age of the standard mortality table,
120 (due to the fact that the standard mortality table has the probability of death
as 1 for age 120 and over), and a. In other words, T is the maximal policy years
possible. Given that we focus on c = (35;male) in this paper, we use the mortality
table of such prole, although the entire procedure can be easily generalized to any
other age-gender combination.
44See Hoopes (2015).
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Upon surrendering, the policy holder with the original prole c can purchase a
new whole life policy at the then market rate to obtain the same level of death benet.
To do so, the policy holder pays (again, WLOG, assume that the insurance premium
is paid lump-sum) the new premium at time s
P c(s) = F
T s+1P
t=1
fc(s+ t)
s+t 1Q
i=1
[1  c(i)]g exp[ R(s; s+ t)t]; (55)
where R(s; s + t) is the interest rate at time s for the period from s to s + t. In
other words, the insurance premium is the actuarially fair value of future benets
(the sum of the present expected value of future benets) multiplied by a "mark-
up" or (gross) margin that the insurer charges,  > 1, and the discounting now
uses the ongoing annual continuously compounded interest rates at time s.  can
be interpreted as an "inverse" of the expense ratio (see for example, Cummins and
VanDerhei (1979)), which is a direct consequence of the operational e¢ ciency of the
insurer but fundamentally reects the competition among insurers. In other words,
 is the parameter that represents the competitive landscape of the life insurance
industry.
At time s, information about the interest rates is known, that is, we know R(s; s+
t). However, at time 0, one does not know such rates with certainty. Consequently,
when calculating option values at time 0, we need to take expectation of these future
insurance premiums. We do so via an interest rate binomial tree, which we now
introduce.
3.3.2 Interest Rate Tree
A risk-neutral interest rate binomial tree is built based on the Ho-Lee model (Ho and
Lee (1986)). This choice is based on its popularity, simplicity, and ability to exactly
t the term structure of interest rates on the one hand, and the fact that it allows
substantial (risk-neutral) probability mass to low interest rates, likely to perform well
in low interest rate environments (better than for instance the Black, Derman and
Toy model (Black, Derman, and Toy (1990)); see Veronesi (2010)) on the other hand.
Given the low interest rates in recent years, it is desirable to have such feature in an
interest rate model.
Let us rst represent a point on the tree as a pair (i; j), where i is the time index
and j is the node index. Following convention, an upward movement is described by
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an increase in the index i, but not in the index j. A downward movement, however,
is described by both an increase in the index i and that in the index j.
Let ri;j be the continuously compounded interest rate in node j between steps i
and i+ 1. Then, for every (i; j) the Ho-Lee model postulates that
ri+1;j = ri;j + i + 
p
 with RN prob. p = 1=2; (56)
as well as
ri+1;j+1 = ri;j + i  
p
 with RN prob. p = 1=2; (57)
where i are free parameters that are chosen to t exactly the current term structure
of interest rates (which will be determined in the numeric section),  is a volatility
parameter based on historical interest rate data, and  is the time interval (a year
in our case). Clearly, the tree is recombining, as an "up and down" movement in
interest rates leads to the same level as a "down and up" movement.
3.3.3 Insurance Premium Calculation via Interest Rate Tree
Let P ci;j denote the value of the insurance premium at point (i; j) on the tree given
prole c. We make the standard assumption of independence between mortality and
nancial markets (See Albizzati and Geman (1994), for example). Then at this point,
there is a probability of c(i) that the policy holder dies, and thus the insurer pays
out the face amount F .
If the policy holder lives, the probability of which is 1   c(i), the continuation
value of the policys death benets is
exp( ri;j)E[P ci+1] = exp( ri;j)(
1
2
P ci+1;j +
1
2
P ci+1;j+1);
where the expectation is with respect to the risk-neutral probability measure. There-
fore, we have
P ci;j = fc(i)F + [1  c(i)] exp( ri;j)(
1
2
P ci+1;j +
1
2
P ci+1;j+1)g:
At the terminal age of 120, even though the policy holder may still live, for actuarial
purpose, we treat it as payout of the face amount with certainty. Thus,
VI;j = F for all j:
We can then construct the tree for the insurance premiums following a backward
recursive procedure. We defer to Section 3.4.2 for an illustration of such procedure.
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Intuitively, the insurance premium, being the scaled actuarially fair value of future
benets, is analogous to a (non-callable) coupon bond with mortality-adjusted coupon
payments. Similarly, just as one would need to introduce the optionality to price a
callable coupon bond, we next introduce the corresponding optionality to price the
surrender option under the condition of fully rational exercising.
3.3.4 Option Pricing - Fully Rational Exercising
To price the surrender option, we rst consider the case that the exercise of the
option is fully rational in response to changes in interest rates. Similar to a rational
homeowner who closes a mortgage only to renance it at a lower mortgage rate, a
rational policy holder surrenders an existing policy only when he/she can nd another
policy with the same amount coverage but with more favorable terms. However, again
just as a homeowner should not necessarily renance the mortgage the rst instant
the ongoing mortgage rate is lower than that of the current mortgage, it is not always
optimal for the policy holder to surrender the policy just yet when the ongoing interest
rates become more attractive.45 That is, there is value for waiting. Essentially, the
surrender option is an American option,46 and this American feature ts well with
the recursive procedure of pricing with an interest rate tree.
Formally, let Vi;j denote the value of the surrender option at point (i; j) on the
tree. At this point, the policy holder can decide whether to exercise the option or
wait. If he/she exercises, the payo¤ is
V Exeri;j = U
c
i   P cij:
Note that the cash surrender value depends only on i but not on j, since its schedule
is xed since the inception of the policy. If the policy holder waits, the value for doing
so is
V Waiti;j = exp( ri;j)E[Vi+1]
= exp( ri;j)(1
2
Vi+1;j +
1
2
Vi+1;j+1):
45Recall that the cash surrender value is obtained by discounting using the statutory rate, whereas
the insurance premium uses the ongoing interest rates. Consequently, an increase in rates incentivizes
a policy holder to cash out an old policy for a new policy, potentially pocketing the di¤erence.
46Strictly speaking, the surrender option is a Bermudan option, since although the policy holder
can exercise this option at any time, the actual payout of the cash surrender value will typically
occur at the next policy anniversary.
98
In order to maximize the value of the surrender option, the policy holder should
choose between exercising and waiting such that
Vi;j = max(V
Exer
i;j ; V
Wait
i;j ): (58)
Moreover, since the option expires worthless at maturity, we have that at the
terminal of the tree I,
VI;j = 0 for all j:
Given this nal value of the option, we can conduct a backward procedure in equation
(58) to obtain the option value at time 0. Such procedure and its results (the tree of
option values) are presented in Section 3.4.2.
3.3.5 Option Pricing - Experience-Based Exercising
As Veronesi (2010) points out, the homeowners prepayment decision depends on a
variety of factors additional to the interest rates. Examples abound, one of which
is the sale of the house as a result of a change in job location. Analogously, the
surrender decision of a policy holder is driven by a number of variables on top of
the interest rates. Section 3.4.2 will detail those that are explicitly considered in this
paper. Here let us just layout the schematics for how to price the option when we
incorporate these factors.
Let p(X; i) denote the probability that a policy holder will surrender his/her policy
at time period i. It is a function of both time and a vector X of variables, interest
rates and beyond. What this probability function entails is the timing of the the
exercise of the surrender option, which in turn determines the resultant cash ow
upon exercise.
Formally, if the option is exercised at time i, the payo¤ to the policy holder is
U c(i)  P c(i); (59)
and the date-0 value of the option is therefore
Efe (r0+r1+r2+:::+ri 1)[U c(i)  P c(i)]g:
We now state two observations. First, the sign of (59) can be positive or nega-
tive. In other words, in contrast to the fully rational case in the previous subsection
where the policy holder cannot lose money by exercising the option, here it is quite
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possible. Indeed, conversation with major life insurers suggests that during the early
years of the policy, it is detrimental to policy holders to surrender their policies, yet
substantial amount of exercising does occur, which is conrmed in the data (See Sec-
tion 3.4.1). Second, we abstract away the dependency of r, U and P on the nodes
(the j subscripts) of the risk-neutral tree, although we are still employing the tree
to determine such quantities, through Monte Carlo simulation (which is also used to
evaluate the expectation). This will become more clear in Section 3.4.2.
3.4 Numerical Analysis
3.4.1 Data and Parameter Values
We rst need term structure of zero coupon rates to calibrate our Ho-Lee tree. I
obtain such data via the stripped curve on Bloomberg. I consider two start dates,
Jan 2, 2014 and Jan 3, 2000, to represent two (indeed drastically di¤erent) interest
rate environments. For maturities 30 years or less, the data are readily available using
the treasuries, where I follow the same intrapolation technique used by Bloomberg for
maturities that do not have direct treasury correspondence. For even longer end of
the curve (recall that we need as far out as 85 years, the di¤erence between 120 and
35), Bloomberg relies on swap rates and sometimes has coverage up until 60 years of
maturity. For further maturities, I employ a moving-average extrapolation technique
following Armstrong and Forecasting (1978). As an illustration, Figure 1 presents
the term structure on Jan 2, 2014, which shows an upward-sloping yield curve, with
rates low around 0:30% at the near end and high around 4:03% at the far end.
The volatility parameter  is set to 0:0173, as in Veronesi (2010), who in turn
estimates such value based on historical interest rate data, and recall that the time
interval  is one year in our case. Then the calibration involves solving, iteratively,
the parameters i to t exactly the term structure of interest rates. Table 2 presents
the calibrated tree along with the solved  values for the start date of Jan 2, 2014
(for the rst ten periods).47
For policy parameter values,  is provided in a standard mortality table, for which
I use the 2001 CSO Table as pointed out in Section 3.3.1. f , the statutory rate, is set
by regulation, and obtained from Towers Watson (2014). F is arbitrary (it is simply
47The tree for the start date of Jan 3, 2000 is contructed in completely the same way and not
shown here to conserve space, but it is available upon request.
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a scale parameter), and WLOG it is set to $1,000.  varies among insurers, on which
we will conduct sensitivity analysis.48
To empirically estimate the surrender probability p, the most critical information
one would need is surrender activity data. Such data should possess at least one
key attribute, which is time-series variation in the sense that one can track each
particular vintage of policies over the years. Ideally, it is preferable to have policy-
level data, which would indeed tackle this issue perfectly. However, policy-level data
are not available due to its proprietary nature, not to mention the di¢ culty in data
collection (and often times the lack of).
Indeed, we face the same issue in mortgage-back securities, and the literature has
proposed the use of aggregate data, such as Schwartz and Torous (1989). This paper
follows such idea. However, we face a new problem: most aggregate data, country-
or state-level (for example, see Russell et al. (2013)), do not enable us to track policy
vintages. In other words, those data are aggregated in such a way that, for instance,
a surrender rate in a particular state of a given year reects the surrender activities
across all vintage years.
How to solve this problem? The answer is industry experience studies, which
are aggregate data as they are aggregated across insurers, yet one of their purposes
is to keep track of policy vintages. This paper uses one large industry experience
study that spans the years 2001 to 2010. In addition to such time-series variation,
the data also provide cross-sectional variation across di¤erent age groups, allowing
us to employ xed-e¤ect estimation. Figure 2 presents the data graphically. We rst
note that there is indeed some across-group variation. Second, for all age groups,
surrender activities tend to concentrate in the rst year after inception of the policy
and level o¤ after year 5. We will analyze these patterns in detail later in this section.
For variables that are likely to have an impact on surrender decisions, data are
available from the following sources. Historical treasury rates come from the Wall
Street Journal. Historical unemployment rates come from the Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics. Historical real per capita income levels come from the Census Bureau. To
price the surrender option at a more recent date, one would also need projections of
these variables. The Congressional Budget O¢ ce provides such projections.
Table 3 provides the summary statistics. We have several observations. First,
there is substantial variation in the surrender rates, as even though they average to
48Conversation with major life insurers suggests that it ranges between 1:05 and 1:20.
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about 5%, some policy years see surrender activity as high as 23%. Second, variation
in the macroeconomic factors is fairly high too, albeit not as drastically as policy
surrender. Third, statutory rates over this period have been quite stable, residing in
the range of 4% to 4.5%.
3.4.2 Methodology
Recursive Procedure
We now illustrate the backward recursive procedure introduced in Section 3.3, using
Table 4, which is an excerpt from the whole option price tree assuming full rationality.
We start from the terminal period, that is, 85 in our case. Again, since the option
expires worthless at maturity, we have the value of the option as 0, the same across
all interest rate possibilities in this period, as shown in Panel B.
The interest rates from Panel A in period 84, however, are each used to discount
the values in period 85 that correspond to an up movement and a down movement
along the interest rate tree from that interest rate. For example, at node j = 0 (which
is the case that rates have gone up every period), we have
V Wait84;0 = exp( r84;0)(
1
2
V85;0 +
1
2
V85;1);
which is obviously 0.
The payo¤ from exercising the option at the same point on the tree, V Exer84;0 , is
878:61 (determined using a tree of insurance premiums and recall that the schedule
of the cash surrender values is xed) for the case where  = 1:2. Then,
V84;0 = max(V
Exer
84;0 ; V
Wait
84;0 ) = 878:61:
Similarly, we have V84;1 = 874:40, reecting again the cash surrender value and the
insurance premium at this point. Following the same procedure backward and recur-
sively, we have V83;0 = 972:87, V82;0 = 973:63, and so on, until we arrive at V0;0 = 9:03.
Empirical Estimation of Surrender Rates
The empirical literature on policy surrender, albeit limited, has proposed several
factors that drive surrender activity. In fact, there are two competing hypotheses
that draw the focus. One is the so called "Emergency Fund Hypothesis" (EFH).
It links life insurance surrender activity to an urgent need for funds during a time
of crisis or need. In other words, the household is more likely to surrender its life
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insurance policy when the need for funds is high such as during unemployment. The
other is the so called "Interest Rate Hypothesis" (IRH). It states that life insurance
surrender activity is directly related to the di¤erential return o¤ered by ongoing
market interest rates over life savings products. Based on this proposition, one would
expect an increase in interest rates to cause an increase in policy surrender. Prior
studies contribute to this debate by providing mixed evidence.
New York Life (1986) surveys surrendering policy holders during a period of high
interest rates.49 It nds that the most common reason for surrendering was a better
value on another insurance product, and hence supports the IRH. Its evidence on
EFH is somewhat vague however, with only one-third of the respondents said they
surrendered their policies because "family circumstances had changed."
Dar and Dodds (1989) explore the relationships amongst interest rates, unem-
ployment, and surrender activity in endowment life insurance policies in the United
Kingdom.50 Using data from 1952 through 1985, they nd a direct relation between
surrender activity and unemployment, but no such relationship was identied be-
tween interest rates and surrender activity. Based on this nding, they concluded
that emergency cash needs drive surrender activity, supporting the EFH.
Outreville (1990) analyzed the e¤ects of macroeconomic variables on early lapsa-
tion using U.S. and Canadian data from the period 195579. He nds that unemploy-
ment has a signicantly positive e¤ect on early lapsation while personal income has
a signicantly negative e¤ect. However, similar to Dar and Dodds (1989), he nds
no such signicant relationship in terms of interest rates, and so he also concludes in
favor of the EFH.
More recently, Russell et al. (2013) utilize state-level aggregate data from 1995
through 2009 to test these hypotheses. Life insurance surrender activity data for
each state are obtained from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners.
They nd that interest rate variables are signicantly positively related to policy
49The survey was completed during a timeframe where short-term interest rates were at extraor-
dinarily high levels (e.g., money market interest rates in excess of 12 percent), so the results clearly
show the impact of large interest rate changes on consumer behavior, with fty-one percent of the
respondents who lapsed bought another policy with better value.
50Endowment policies pay a xed amount to the policy holder if he/she lives to the maturity date.
If the policy holder dies prior to maturity, the beneciary receives a death benet. In recent years,
endowment products have nearly vanished from the US life insurance scene because changes in US
tax laws (the Decit Reduction Act of 1984) drastically reduced the attractiveness of this policy as
a tax shelter.
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surrender and show a negative relation between real per capita income and surrender
activity. In other words, at the state level, there is evidence for both the IRH and
the EFH. However, surprisingly, they also nd that policy surrender decreases with
unemployment, which is counter-intuitive and in contrast to expectations from the
EFH. Therefore, evidence for EFH remains mixed.
As mentioned in the previous subsection, the aggregate data (country- or state-
level) in prior studies cannot track policy vintages, as even at the state-level, one data
point of surrender rate in a particular state of a given year reects the surrender ac-
tivities across all vintage years. However, from Figure 2, the e¤ect of policy vintages,
especially that of the rst year, seems quite pronounced. The industry experience
study data employed in this paper allows us, for the rst time, to capture such e¤ect.
I model life insurance surrender activity as a function of the householdsliquidity
needs for cash, interest rate arbitrage opportunities, and policy vintages:
Surrender = f(Liquidity; Arbitrage; V intage):
Proxies for liquidity needs are unemployment rates and real per-capita income levels.
Interest rate arbitrage opportunities are proxied by the di¤erential between (short-
and long-term) treasury rate and the regulatory rate provided in the insurance policy.
Policy vintages are the number in years since policy inception where both an emphasis
on the rst year and a year trend will be explored.
More specically, as unemployment increases, a greater proportion of the insured
would likely surrender cash-value life insurance policies to gain access to the cash
surrender value, and we therefore expect a positive relation between unemployment
rate and surrender activity. Prior research provides evidence that life insurance de-
mand increases as income increases, suggesting that the insured would be less likely
to surrender policies (See Zietz (2003)). So we expect that as real per capita income
decreases, individuals will be more likely to surrender, and thus a negative relation
between income and surrender. For interest rates, since the IRH predicts a positive
relation between interest rates and policy surrender, we expect the same as intuitively,
the higher the ongoing interest rates relative to the regulatory rate are, the more in-
centivized policy holders are to e¤ectively "re-nance" their policies. Furthermore,
based on what we observe in Figure 2, we expect the rst policy year to have a strong
positive e¤ect on surrender, whereas the impact of time trend does not appear too
substantial.
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Finally, the panel data enables us to include age-group xed e¤ects. This has two
potential benets. First, it may allow us to explain more of the variation in the data.
Second, we can laser on one particular age group when we predict the surrender rate
(for instance the age group closest to the age 35) in order to price the option related
to the insurance policy with that age prole. It is likely important, since people in
di¤erent age groups presumably make decisions di¤erently given their di¤erent stages
in the consumption/investment life cycle, and so this may capture such demographic
e¤ect.
Monte Carlo Simulation
Monte Carlo simulation in nance, since the pioneer work by Boyle (1977), has
become a standard procedure for pricing relative complex nancial securities. One
uses computer programs to simulate several interest rate scenarios in the future, and
then obtain the value of the security by averaging an appropriate discounted value
of the payo¤. I use Monte Carlo simulation to price the surrender options where
exercising is experience-based. The rationale is to capture the additional factors
above that impact the policy holders surrendering decisions beyond interest rates.
The key is to simulate such surrender decisions over time.
To illustrate the procedure, let us rst recall our (risk-neutral) Ho-Lee interest
rate model in Equations (56) and (57). Because the interest rate process goes up or
down with equal probabilities, one can simulate the paths on the tree by utilizing a
random number generator. For instance, consider a random number generator based
on the uniform (0; 1) distribution. Then we can simulate a large number of times,
and each time the realization is on one side of 0:5 we say that the interest rate moved
up the tree (i.e., +
p
), and each time the realization is on the other one side of
0:5 we say that the interest rate movement is negative (i.e.,  p). We can record
each path, along which we can discount the corresponding cash ows. Then given
all of the simulation paths, we average the discounted payo¤s across these paths to
obtain the security price (in our case, the price of the surrender option).
As an example, in Table 5, I rst provide an excerpt of the simulated interest rate
paths (10 simulations from year 0 to year 10) in Panel A. Then we can simulate a
discount Zs(0; Ti) for each simulation path s and for each time period Ti = 1; 2; :::,
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in Panel B, as51
Zs(0; Ti) = e
 (r0+rs1+rs2+:::+rsi 1);
which can be thought of as one realization of the discount factor Z(0; Ti), that is,
the risk-neutral expected discounted value of $1 at time Ti. In other words, from
risk-neutral pricing, we have
Z(0; Ti) = E
[e (r0+r1+r2+:::+ri 1)  $1]: (60)
Given all of the simulation paths, for each time period Ti we can compute the average
discount across simulations, that is,
bZ(0; Ti) = 1
N
NX
s=1
Zs(0; Ti);
where N is the number of simulated paths. This is an approximation obtained by
Monte Carlo simulations of the true discount factor (60).
One can use these simulated discounts to price the zero coupon bonds. Since this
binomial tree is such that the prices of zero coupon bonds computed from it exactly
match the data, the simulated zero coupon bond prices should be quite close to those
in the data. We indeed obtain close results in Panel C, which serves as a sanity
check on the calculation procedure. In addition (not reported here for consideration
of space), we determine the number of simulations needed based on this closeness
between simulated zero coupon bonds and data, and 10; 000 seems su¢ cient, although
with enough computing power, this study uses 30; 000 simulations.
Finally, to simulate surrender decisions over time, we employ another random
number generator and compare it with the empirical surrender function. Specically,
for each period, the random number generated can be either less than or not less
than the estimated surrender rate of that period. Now the procedure is such that the
rst instance the former case occurs, the policy is surrendered. This determines the
timing of surrender as well as the corresponding cash ow. The rest of the pricing
procedure is then similar to the above.
51Note that the last interest rate used to discount a payo¤ at time Ti (i.e., period i) is the one
corresponding to the previous period, i 1, as there is a lag of one period between the cash ow and
the interest rate needed to discount it. For instance, the rst interest rate r0 is used to discount a
cash ow at i = 1.
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3.4.3 Results
Empirics
I consider both short-term (one-year) and long-term (ten-year) treasury rates as
our proxies for interest rates.52 I report only results related to the ten-year rates
while those for the one-year rates are available upon request. I focus on the ten-year
rates for three reasons. First, the results for the one-year rates are in fact stronger,
with higher statistical signicance and expected signs on all variables of interest. So
we are being more conservative by using the results for the ten-year rates. Second,
the Congressional Budget O¢ ce provides projections on the ten-year rates but not
the one-year rates, and thus we want to stay close to their estimation. Third, life
insurers, being long-term participants of the nancial market, tend to focus on the
longer end of the curve.
Table 6 presents the results with the three macroeconomic variables that are the
focal points of previous studies, namely, interest rate, unemployment rate, and real
per capita income. Similar to Russell et al. (2013), we nd the coe¢ cient associated
with interest rate is positive and highly signicant, while that associated with real
per capita income is negative and highly signicant. Unlike Russell et al. (2013), we
nd a positive coe¢ cient of unemployment rate (when all three variables are present),
albeit insignicant.
We further include age-group xed e¤ects in our analysis given the panel nature of
the data, as Table 7 reports. Coe¢ cients and signicance remain the same as before,
although the tness of the model does increase substantially, for example, from 43.5%
in Specication (7) of Table 6 to 53.0% in Specication (7) of Table 7. Moreover, as
mentioned above, incorporating xed e¤ects allow us to capture the di¤erence among
age-groups, which is important since each insurance policy is after all age-specic.
The most striking improvement comes with the inclusion of policy vintage e¤ect,
especially the rst year. As Table 8 shows, for instance Specication (4), not only
do interest rate and real per capita income remain signicant with expected signs,
unemployment rate also becomes signicant (and positive, as the EFH suggests). In
addition, Year1, the variable representing the rst policy year, is highly signicant
52The 30-year treasury bond o¤ers the longest maturity among treasury securities and was com-
monly used as a proxy for long-term interest rates. This role has largely been taken over by the
10-year note, however, as the size and frequency of the 30-year bond issues declined signicantly in
the 1990s and early 2000s.
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and positive. The economic magnitude of this variable is also especially prominent,
as the rst policy year sees on average approximately 8:2 percentage points more
likelihood of surrender. This reects the conspicuous pattern observed in Figure 2.
Furthermore, along with the age-group xed e¤ects, the model with the rst policy
year is now able to explain 82% of the variation, which gives us condence in using the
empirically estimated surrender rates in our pricing model. Additionally, year trend
does not seem to provide extra mileage and in fact adds more noise to the analysis.
Indeed, observing Figure 2 again does not seem to give us indication of the presence
of time trend. Therefore, we use Specication (4) of Table 8 for pricing consideration
in the next subsection.
All in all, the fact that our industry experience data allow us to capture the
policy vintage e¤ect improves upon existing literature in at least two aspects. First,
it captures an explanatory variable that appears even more important than all the
marcoeconomic factors considered in prior studies. Second, with the inclusion of such
e¤ect, all these marcoeconomic factors are now statistically signicant, providing full
support to both the EFH and the IRH.
As for why policy vintage has such a strong impact, anecdotally, it seems at-
tributable to high pressure agents. Their powerful sales techniques appear capable
of bringing new customers that are not yet familiar with the nuts and bolts of life
insurance. Some of these customers are not sure if they really want life insurance or
do not nd their current policy favorable. Whether this is indeed the case is outside
the scope of this paper, and we leave it to future research to examine more closely
the reason behind the importance of the policy vintage e¤ect.
Option Pricing
Experience-Based Option Price and Sensitivity to the Insurers Mark-
Up
With the empirics above, we can estimate the surrender rates for di¤erent policy
years using the macroeconomic factors and the policy vintage e¤ect. Specically,
with the projections from the Congressional Budget O¢ ce, one can predict surrender
rates for the next ten policy years (2015 to 2024). Given the atness in surrender
activity in the later years of Figure 2, we assume similar atness beyond policy year
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10.53 This is similar to the practice of using the Public Securities Association (PSA)54
experience to price MBS (See for example, Hayre (2002)). The estimated surrender
rates are presented in Figure 3 for a policy whose holder at policy inception is within
the age group of 35 to 39.
As mentioned before, based on these estimated surrender rates, we can simulate
the surrender decision by generating a series of random numbers for each interest
rate path. Then along one path, whenever the rst random number is below the
surrender rate for that period, the policy is surrendered. The payo¤ of the option for
that path is the di¤erence at the time of surrender between the cash surrender value
and new insurance premium, discounted by the sequence of interest rates along the
path. Then, the date-0 value of the surrender option is obtained by averaging across
all simulated paths.
The mark-up factor, , in equation (55) turns out to play a crucial role in the
pricing. I present the option values as a function of , in Figure 4, using the common
levels suggested by the industry, 1:05 to 1:20. A direct observation is that the option
value decreases with . This is intuitive, as what the mark-up does e¤ectively is to
absorb the cost of surrendering (from the insurers perspective) in addition to making
a prot. In fact, when  is su¢ ciently high, actually just about 1:06, given the recent
interest rate environment (the Jan 2, 2014 term structure), the option value can be
negative. In other words, with su¢ ciently high , the experience-based option value
is completely priced in, and it imposes minimal surrender risk to the insurers.
Comparison with Fully Rational Option Price
To put the above experience-based option values into perspective, let us now
compare them with the fully rational option prices. Figure 5 presents the case. The
fully rational option value also decreases with , from about $15:84 for  = 1:05 to
about $9:03 for  = 1:20,55 although not as dramatically as that for the experience-
based option value. Also for each level of , the experience-based option value is
lower than the fully rational counterpart. Moreover, the fully rational option value is
always positive, which is intuitive given the optimality in option exercising. However,
53We use again the moving-average extrapolation technique (Armstrong and Forecasting (1978)),
although assuming a straight atness provides similar results.
54It was renamed to Bond Market Association and later merged with the Securities Industry
Association to form the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association.
55The scale of the axis makes this decrease less discernible, although zooming in, the change is
still substantial percentage wise.
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this does illustrate the limitation of a fully rational pricing model. It leads to inated
option prices due to lack of consideration for the additional factors beyond interest
rates that drive the surrender decision as well as for the prevalence in the data of
sub-optimal option exercising.
Consequently, as a practical policy implication, an insurer considering hedging the
surrender risk embedded in their insurance contracts should think beyond the theo-
retical fair valuation of the surrender options proposed in prior studies. In particular,
within a low interest rate environment such as recently, there does not appear much
hedging need. Of course, the nancial market may recognize this by o¤ering really
discounted hedging instruments like high-strike interest rate caps, but investing in
such instruments can still be a waste of resources.
Now again, how much surrender risk a life insurer exposes to depends closely on
its . The life insurer certainly would like to set a high , but how high is possible
is beyond the insurers control due to the competitiveness of the market. Indeed, as
hinted above, what  represents is the competitive landscape of the whole industry.
Therefore, during episodes of market expansion (such as those of the 1920s and the
1960s, see Obersteadt et al. (2013)), it is advisable that life insurers be more alert
for hedging.
Changes in Interest Rate Environment
The recent interest rate environment (as represented by the term structure of
Jan 2, 2014) is characterized by low rates at both the near end and the far end of
the curve. These are likely results of the Federal Reserves monetary policy as well
as the quantitative easing programs, intended to battle the aftermath of the Great
Recession. However, historically, regimes of high interest rates are evident (see, for
example, Figure 6 of the ten-year treasury rates between 1962 and 2012). How do
changes in interest rate environment impact our surrender option prices?
To address this question, we obtain the term structure of another date, Jan 3,
2000, as mentioned in the data section, which contrasts quite substantially with that
of Jan 2, 2014. Indeed, one can see from Figure 7 while the general upward-sloping
shapes of the yield curves between the two dates are fairly similar, the levels are
drastically di¤erent. On Jan 3, 2000, even the very near-end of the curve saw an
interest rate that is higher than that at the very far-end of the curve on Jan 2, 2014.
Intuitively, higher rates e¤ectively make it more likely that the option is "in-the-
money." So we expect higher option values associated with the term structure of Jan
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3, 2000 than that of Jan 2, 2014. Figure 8 compares the fully rational option prices
between the two rate environments across di¤erent levels of . Clearly, option values
based on the 2000 term structure are strictly higher than those based on the 2014
term structure.
We expect the same for experience-based option values. To calculate those asso-
ciated with the 2000 term structure, we need surrender rates across di¤erent policy
years. Recall that with the 2014 term structure, we relied on projections from the
Congressional Budget O¢ ce. After all, we do not have data on interest rates, real per
capita income, etc. for future years yet. For the 2000 term structure, we have those
data readily available, and so we do not need to use projections. Instead, we use
actual data to estimate the surrender rates. Then using these estimated surrender
rates, we can price the experience-based option prices for the 2000 term structure
in the same way as those for the 2014 term structure, and Figure 9 illustrates the
comparison. Similar to the fully rational case, option values based on the 2000 term
structure are strictly higher than those based on the 2014 term structure. Moreover,
for those of the 2000 term structure, it now takes a  of 1:18 to have a negative option
price. In other words, in the high interest rate environment during the early 2000s,
it was quite unlikely that the surrender risk was fully priced in, and it was during
times such as this that life insurers should really consider hedging the surrender risk
embedded in their insurance policies.
3.5 Conclusion
Life insurance often embeds a surrender option that gives the policy holder a right
to exchange an existing contract for its cash surrender value. Similar to mortgage
prepayment option that imposes a cash-ow risk to MBS investors, this surrender
option is a source of concern for life insurers. Understanding the adverse impact of
the surrender risk is therefore critical for the risk management of life insurers.
While prior literature has attempted to quantify this surrender risk by pricing the
surrender options, what existing studies share in common is the theoretical assump-
tion of fully rational response of policy holders to interest rates. However, realistically,
whether to surrender an existing policy is a multi-faceted decision, just as interest
rates are only one of the many factors that drive the mortgage prepayment decision.
Indeed, MBS valuation in light of empirical prepayment experience has become more
favorable after being heavily studied by academics and practitioners alike. Never-
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theless, such transition is still at its infancy for surrender options in life insurance
policies primarily due to limitation of data.
This paper lls this gap in the literature by integrating an empirical surrender
function into the option pricing framework. It relies on a novel data set from a
large life insurance industry experience study, and accounts, for the rst time, policy
vintage years, whose analogy in the MBS community has been shown repeatedly as
a prominent factor for prepayment decision. In fact, I show that the rst policy year
has a signicantly positive impact on policy surrender, in addition to a positive e¤ect
related to interest rates, a positive e¤ect from unemployment and a negative e¤ect
associated with income, the factors that have previously been proposed. Moreover,
while prior studies provide mixed evidence on these latter factors, creating a debate
between the so called Interest Rate Hypothesis and the Emergency Fund Hypothesis,
the current study presents more consistent evidence that unies both.
With these empirics, the option value based on actual surrender experience is
calculated and compared to that based on the assumption of full rationality. I nd
that the experience-based option value is substantially less than its fully rational
counterpart, which suggests suboptimality of surrender activity in practice. Moreover,
while the fully rational option value is always positive, the experience-based option
value can sometimes be negative, indicating that life insurers can make a prot from
the exercising of the option even though they are the writers of the option.
In addition, I nd that the value of the surrender option is especially sensitive to
the insurers mark-up, which reects the competitive landscape of the life insurance
industry. A less competitive market allows the insurers a greater margin on their
products, which reduces the cash ows to the policy holders upon surrendering the
policies. On the other hand, the interest rate environment also plays a critical role
in the option value, with higher interest rates e¤ectively increasing the moneyness of
the option and hence subject the insurer to more cash-ow risk.
Finally, it is conceivable that factors beyond those in this paper and the existing
literature may impact the surrender decision. Future studies can therefore direct at
analyzing those factors. Such e¤orts will likely require more granular data incorpo-
rating policy holder demographics, but will also be rewarded with ner estimation of
policy surrender that further improves the pricing accuracy.
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Appendix
Table 1. Four di¤erent types of permanent life insurance policies. What characterize
the di¤erences are the premium structure and the party who makes the investment
choice, which in turn determines the structure of the death benet. Whole life policies
are the focus of this paper.
Premium Investment Choice Death Benet
Whole Life Fixed Insurer Fixed
Universal Life Flexible Insurer Fixed
Variable Life Fixed Insured Flexible
Variable-Universal Life Flexible Insured Flexible
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Table 3. Summary statistics of the main variables. Surrender data are from a large
industry experience study. Treasury rates come from the Wall Street Journal. Un-
employment rates are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Real per capita income
levels are obtained from the Census Bureau and in 2013 dollars. Statutory rates are
from Towers Watson (2014).
mean sd min max
Surrender Rate (%) 4.82 4.09 0.00 23.02
1-Year Rate (%) 2.63 1.68 0.40 5.11
10-Year Rate (%) 4.18 0.73 2.52 5.16
Unemployment Rate (%) 5.85 1.60 4.20 9.70
Real Income ($) 25102.20 1659.21 22794.00 26964.00
Statutory Rate (%) 4.25 0.25 4.00 4.50
Observations 170
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Table 8. Results with age-group xed e¤ects and policy vintage e¤ect. The dependent
variable for each specication is the ratio of policy surrenders to the total number of
policies for a given year xing the policy origination time. Interest is the di¤erence
between the ten-year treasury rate and the statutory rate of that year. Unemploy
is the unemployment rate. Income is the real per capita income, in terms of 2013
dollars. Year1 is an indicator variable representing the rst policy year. Trend is the
year trend, denoting the number of years the policy has been in e¤ect. Standard errors
are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at the age-group level for specications
with age-group xed e¤ects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Surrender Surrender Surrender Surrender Surrender Surrender
Interest 1:123 1:280 0:977 1:123 1:280 0:977
(3.79) (3.02) (2.95) (6.26) (3.22) (3.52)
Unemploy 0:199 1:341 0.485 0:199 1:341 0.485
(2.23) (2.81) (1.69) (5.66) (2.85) (1.90)
Income  0:0007 0.00172 -0.0001  0:0007 0.00172 -0.0001
(-5.78) (1.56) (-0.14) (-6.71) (1.59) (-0.15)
Year1 8:188 8:126 8:188 8:126
(6.65) (6.58) (12.57) (8.84)
Trend  2:142 -0.472  2:142 -0.472
(-2.69) (-1.07) (-2.74) (-1.19)
Constant 21:65 -34.45 5.985 20:07 -36.04 4.399
(6.77) (-1.32) (0.40) (7.73) (-1.41) (0.33)
Observations 170 170 170 170 170 170
Adjusted R2 0.696 0.443 0.695 0.820 0.540 0.820
FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
t statistics in parentheses
p < 0:05; p < 0:01; p < 0:001
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Figure 11: Term structure of interest rates on Jan 2, 2014
125
Figure 12: Graphical presentation of the surrender activity over policy years across
di¤erent age groups. The surrender data are obtained from a large industry experience
study.
126
Figure 13: Estimated surrender rate. Specication (4) of Table 8 for the age group of
35 to 39 provides the basis of this estimation. The inputs related to macroeconomic
factors are the projections from the Congressional Budget O¢ ce. First ten policy
years are shown.
Figure 14: Experience-based option value. Specication (4) of Table 8 for the age
group of 35 to 39 provides the basis of the estimation of the surrender rates. The
inputs related to macroeconomic factors are the projections from the Congressional
Budget O¢ ce. Option values are in dollars per $1,000 of policy face amount.
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Figure 15: Comparison between fully rational and experience-based option values.
Specication (4) of Table 8 for the age group of 35 to 39 provides the basis of the
estimation of the surrender rates. The inputs related to macroeconomic factors are
the projections from the Congressional Budget O¢ ce. Option values are in dollars
per $1,000 of policy face amount.
Figure 16: Historical ten-year treasury rates. The time period is 1962 to 2012.
Sources: Federal Reserve, Treasury, and Bloomberg.
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Figure 17: Term structure comparison between Jan 2, 2014 and Jan 3, 2010
Figure 18: Sensitivity to interest rate environment - fully rational option values.
Option values are in dollars per $1,000 of policy face amount.
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Figure 19: Sensitivity to interest rate environment - experience-based option values.
Specication (4) of Table 8 for the age group of 35 to 39 provides the basis of the
estimation of the surrender rates. The inputs related to macroeconomic factors are
actual historical data. Option values are in dollars per $1,000 of policy face amount.
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